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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of Corporate and Community Characteristics on Environmental 
Pollution in U.S. Electrical Generating Facilities: A Multilevel Examination. 
(August 2011) 
George Earl Touch , B.S., University of New Orleans;  
M.S., University of New Orleans; 
 Ph.D., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Harland Prechel 
 
This dissertation uses multilevel modeling to examine the effects of corporate 
and community characteristics on rates of sulfur dioxide emitted by facilities in 
the electrical power industry. The conceptual framework draws from 
ecostructural theory to emphasize the social-structural causes of pollution. It 
also draws from organizational resource dependence theory and the 
shareholder conception of value. This framework suggests the contemporary 
transformation in corporate form and the changes in the basic relationship 
between the corporation and its shareholders have created dependencies, 
opportunities, and incentives that affect pollution. At the local community level, 
the conceptual framework also draws from theoretical insights of environmental 
justice scholars and other scholars in the environmental sociology and social-
movement literature. The power plants examined in this dissertation are owned 
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by the largest corporations in the electrical power industry and are located in 
many different communities across the United States. The multilevel models 
include three corporate characteristics and four local community characteristics 
as independent variables. They also include several facility and local community 
characteristics as control variables. In accordance with ecostructural theory, the 
findings demonstrate that the total number of subsidiaries in the corporate 
structure and the dividend payments to shareholders have significant positive 
effects on the power plant emissions rates. The analysis of community 
demography shows that relationships involving the power plant emissions rates 
and percent African Americans, percent families in poverty, and median home 
values are contingent on the geographic unit of analysis. Hence, the 
demographic analysis does not consistently support any theory of environmental 
inequality. On the other hand, all models show that the prevalence of non-profit 
organizations in the county has a significant negative effect on the power plant 
emissions rates. This follows in accordance with both ecostructural theory and 
the path of least resistance theory that underpins the sociopolitical model of 
environmental inequality. Lastly, all models show that facility control variables 
involving size, age, and fuel mix have significant effects on the emissions rates. 
In sum, this dissertation brings together and simultaneously tests theoretical 
insights from several lines of research to demonstrate that different levels of 
social structure explain environmental pollution. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND LITERATURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research on environmental justice has focused on populations that are exposed 
to pollution by examining the characteristics of communities where hazardous 
facilities are located. This research has shown that communities with a high 
proportion of disadvantaged citizens are disproportionately exposed to pollution 
(Bryant and Mohai 1992; Bullard 1994, 1996, 2001). Researchers in this tradition 
also find that neither the government nor the legal system has effectively 
addressed the problem (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright 2007; Gordon and 
Harley 2005; Harden 2002). 
 
More recently, researchers began to focus on organizational characteristics as 
explanations for pollution (Grant, Bergesen, and Jones, 2002). This line of 
research recognizes that organizations are among the largest polluters in society 
(Perrow 1997). Research in this tradition has shown that the size of facilities and 
whether they are embedded in subsidiaries are determinants of pollution rates 
(Grant et al. 2002; Grant and Jones 2003). Other researchers who examine a 
wider range of social-structural characteristics and focus on the ultimate parent 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Sociological Review. 
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company as the unit of analysis have shown that organizational structure, 
financial characteristics, and political structure are determinants of pollution 
rates (Prechel 2009; Prechel and Zheng 2009). 
 
Drawing from these research traditions, this dissertation suggests that research 
on environmental pollution must examine both levels of analysis. To fill this gap 
in the literature, I focus on facilities in the high-polluting electrical power industry 
by using multilevel statistical modeling to address two research questions. First, 
how do the organizational structure and financial characteristics of large 
corporations that own power plants affect pollution rates? Second, how do the 
demographic and social-structural characteristics of local communities where 
power plants are located affect pollution rates?  
 
This multilevel research is important because environmental sociologists tend to 
concentrate on only one of these levels of analysis. In contrast, the research 
herein simultaneously tests the effects of corporate and community 
characteristics on power plant emissions rates. By grouping power plants owned 
by a parent company, this method identifies the effects of the corporate 
characteristics and the community characteristics in the same model; it 
examines the effects of variables at one level of analysis while controlling for the 
effects of variables at the other level of analysis. 
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The basic argument and the recurring theme throughout this dissertation is that 
organizations matter. The multilevel examination substantiates theoretically and 
demonstrates empirically that variation in power plant emissions rates is 
explained by organizational determinants at the corporate level and by 
organizational deterrents at the local community level. Policy makers, planners, 
and concerned scientists can use this knowledge to promote sustainable 
development and ensure that the human population and the natural environment 
are protected from pollution.  
 
There are five chapters in this dissertation. Chapter I elaborates on the theory 
and the literature used to derive the conceptual framework. Chapter II specifies 
the hypotheses. Chapter III discusses the research design including the study 
group, the variable measures, and the data sources. Chapter III also explicates 
the structure of the multilevel models with the basic equations used to test the 
hypotheses. The results and findings are presented in Chapter IV. Finally, 
Chapter V provides a summary discussion to conclude the dissertation.   
 
THEORY AND LITERATURE 
 
The conceptual framework draws from ecostructural theory. Following Prechel 
(2009) and Prechel and Zheng (2009), it also draws from theories in 
organizational and political sociology that suggest the contemporary 
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transformation in corporate form and the changes in the basic relationship 
between the corporation and its investing shareholders have created 
dependencies, opportunities, and incentives that affect pollution. At the local 
community level, the conceptual framework draws from the theoretical insights 
of environmental justice scholars and related scholars in the environmental 
sociology and social movement literature. The following sections of this chapter 
discuss ecostructural theory and other theories in environmental sociology.  
 
Meso-Organizational Level of Analysis: Corporations as a Cause of 
Pollution  
 
Ecostructural Theory 
 
Ecostructural theory draws from a long line of theories in environmental 
sociology to emphasize the social-structural causes of pollution (Grant et al. 
2002). Much research that may be included under the label ecostructuralism has 
focused at the macro level of analysis on the effects that social-structural factors 
such as nation states, modes of production, and world systems have on the 
environment (Hay 1994; Jorgenson 2003, 2009; Jorgenson, Dick, and Mahutga 
2007; O‘Connor 1994; Schnaiberg 1980, 1994, 1997). As stressed by Grant et 
al. (2002), however, it has become difficult to account for how all the different 
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macro structures matter because they typically are far removed from the sites of 
production where pollution occurs.  
 
Ecostructural theorists therefore have directed attention to organizations and the 
effects that organizational structures have on the environment (Grant et al. 2002; 
Grant and Jones 2003; Grant, Jones, and Trautner 2004). These theorists 
recognize that production techniques are both arranged and implemented within 
organizations where decision-making power is concentrated and executed. 
Thus, focusing ecostructural research on organizations can improve knowledge 
of the social-structural causes of pollution.   
 
Although these theorists have made some valuable contributions, their research 
agenda on organizational characteristics and pollution is incomplete. Their 
studies of the chemical industry that show the effects of facility size and 
subsidiary status on toxic emissions rates focus too narrowly on the polluting 
facilities without including many other important organizational variables in the 
analysis (Grant et al. 2002; Grant and Jones 2003). With the exception of firm 
size, characteristics of the corporations that own the facilities are not included 
among the explanatory variables. Even the recent work by Grant, Trautner, 
Downey, and Thiebaud (2010) that draws attention to the conjoint effects of 
facility characteristics and local community characteristics on chemical plant 
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emissions rates does not examine characteristics of the corporations that own 
the facilities. 
 
Other theorists have begun to study the effects of a wide range of corporate 
characteristics on pollution (Prechel forthcoming; Prechel and Zheng 2009). 
Their elaboration of ecostructural theory draws from several prominent theories 
in organizational and political sociology to specify how the organizational 
structure of corporations and their embeddedness in the political-legal 
environment have created dependencies, opportunities, and incentives that 
discourage corporations from improving on ecoefficiency. As indicated by 
Prechel (2009, p. 14), ―ecoefficiency reflects the capacity of corporations to 
create more goods and services with less environmental pollution.‖  
 
The contributions of these theorists provide both historical contextualization and 
quantitative analysis that advance knowledge of corporate characteristics as 
determinants of pollution (Prechel 2009, forthcoming; Prechel and Zheng 2009). 
These studies explain rates of toxic emissions that are aggregated up to the 
ultimate parent company. The multilevel examination in this dissertation includes 
corporate size and two other characteristics. One involves the multilayer-
subsidiary form. The other involves shareholder value. These characteristics are 
discussed in this chapter and then further elaborated in Chapter II. 
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Capital Dependence and the Incentives and Opportunities for Corporations in 
the Multilayer-Subsidiary Form to Pollute  
 
Organizational resource dependence theory recognizes the importance of power 
and uses the concept of embeddedness to explain organizational behavior 
(Pfeffer and Salanik 1978). Resource dependence theorists argue that 
organizations are embedded in networks with other organizations and that they 
are externally constrained and controlled by inter-organizational resource 
dependencies. These theorists also argue that under certain conditions 
organizations have opportunities to respond actively by restructuring and by 
recreating their networks of organizational interdependencies in the environment 
(Pfeffer and Salanik 1978).  
 
Capital is a special type of resource that corporations depend on for survival 
(Prechel 1997). Although their response varies with historical conditions, 
corporations generally respond to capital dependency in two basic ways; they 
mobilize politically to change the policies of the state, and they transform their 
structures to better align themselves with the political-legal environment (Boies 
and Prechel 2002; Prechel 2000). Corporations use a variety of specific 
mechanisms as they try to cope with uncertainty and establish conditions of 
stability. Examples include using mergers to acquire other organizations that 
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possess critical resources and using political contributions to influence policies 
that involve taxes and regulations.   
 
Research on capital dependence has examined several periods of historical 
transition and corporate transformation in the United States (Prechel 2000). The 
most recent transformation occurred at the end of the 20th century when 
corporations changed their structures from the multidivisional form to the 
multilayer-subsidiary form (Prechel and Boies 1998)1. The multilayer-subsidiary 
form is defined by Prechel (2000, p. 12) as: 
 
―a corporation with a hierarchy of two or more levels of subsidiary corporations 
with a parent company at the top of the hierarchy operating as a management 
company.‖  
 
Unlike divisions, subsidiaries are separate legal entities in which the parent 
company owns more than 50% of the stock (Prechel 1997). This corporate form 
permits the parent company to issue up to 50% of the stock in its subsidiaries 
while maintaining ownership control. Thus, the multilayer-subsidiary form 
enhances the equity-financing capabilities of parent companies and reduces 
                                                 
1
 Prechel (2000) and Boies and Prechel (2002) discuss how corporations mobilized politically 
during the 1980s in response to declining profits and high-interest debt. They show how the 
corporate political activity resulted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of 1987 
that eliminated a New Deal tax on capital transfers from subsidiary corporations to parent 
companies and encouraged corporations to transform their divisions into subsidiaries.  
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their debt dependence on banks (Boies and Prechel 2002; Prechel and Boies 
1998).  
 
An important implication for ecostructural theory is that corporations in the 
multilayer-subsidiary form have opportunities and incentives to evade legal 
liability as they externalize pollution costs. Research has shown that 
corporations in liability-prone industries were among the first to change to the 
multilayer-subsidiary form because the legal status of subsidiaries protects 
parent companies from subsidiary liabilities involving bankruptcies and tort 
lawsuits (Prechel and Boies 1998). A separate study of the electrical power 
industry finds that the total number of subsidiaries is positively related to toxic 
emissions rates for electrical power producing corporations (Prechel 
forthcoming). The multilevel examination here extends this line of research by 
examining whether the corporate subsidiary structure explains variations in 
facility emissions rates.         
 
Capital Dependence of Corporations on Investors  
 
This dissertation also incorporates the concept of shareholder value (Krier 2005; 
Useem 1996). The transformation to the multilayer-subsidiary form was part of a 
corporate restructuring that reoriented managerial practices toward financial 
speculation and the maximization of shareholder value (Krier 2005). Investors 
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who own corporations have gained power in their relationship with managers 
who directly control corporations (Useem 1996). The point here is that the 
structural transformation to the multilayer-subsidiary form that made 
corporations less dependent on banks as sources of debt financing also made 
them more dependent on large institutional investors and other wealthy 
shareholders who purchase their securities (Prechel 2000).  
 
The contemporary era of investor capitalism differs fundamentally from the 
managerial capitalism of the middle 20th century. Institutional investors with 
concentrated stock ownership now have a determining voice in corporate 
decision making that allows them to exert greater pressure on management 
(Useem 1996). Corporate governance has been transformed into teams of 
activist owners and stock-optioned executives who together implement 
speculative management practices to boost shareholder interests in secondary 
stock markets (Krier 2005). Satisfying the interests of shareholders clearly has 
become a powerful incentive and a top priority for corporate management.  
 
The institutional structure of speculative finance has caused economic problems 
for much of U.S. society (Krier 2005). Ecostructural research has begun to study 
how the corporate dependence on shareholders affects environmental pollution 
(Prechel 2009, forthcoming). This research finds that corporate dividend 
payments relate positively to rates of toxic emissions that are aggregated up 
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from the facilities to the corporations that own the facilities. These findings 
suggest that the priorities of corporate managers favor increasing returns to 
shareholders instead of improving on ecoefficiency by investing in pollution 
abatement technologies (Prechel 2009, forthcoming). The dissertation here 
draws from this line of research to examine how the corporate dependence on 
shareholders affects pollution at the facilities.          
 
Energy Industry Deregulation: Expanded Opportunity for Corporations to Pollute   
 
Energy deregulation and electrical utility restructuring have received much 
assessment by members of the press in recent years (Adams 2005; Dennis 
2006; Kosseff 2005; Perine 2002). Historical analysis of the industry shows that 
corporate power producers responded to capital constraints during the 1970s 
and 1980s by mobilizing politically for deregulatory energy policies and by using 
corporate structures that are difficult to monitor and regulate (Prechel 2009; 
forthcoming). For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 established a new 
class of electrical wholesale generators (EWGs) that were exempt from the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and not subject to the size and fuel 
limitations that applied to small independent power producers under the Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Energy Information Administration 
1993, 2000). These EWGs could be owned anywhere in the United States by 
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both U.S. SEC registered and exempt utility holding companies (Energy 
Information Administration 1993, 2000)2.  
 
The critics have focused on many aspects of energy deregulation (Groth 1985; 
Grunwald and Eilperin 2005; Sze 2005; Timney 2002). For instance, 
deregulation created disincentives for investments in reliability and efficiency 
that could have lowered electricity rates for customers (Slocum 2008). The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 is important because this act, in conjunction with the 
multilayer-subsidiary form, provided an early opportunity for corporations in the 
electrical power industry to expand their ownership of polluting power plants 
geographically through their subsidiaries without oversight by the U.S. SEC 
(Prechel 2009, forthcoming)3. The point here for ecostructural theory is that the 
deregulation and lax enforcement of the contemporary era have created 
opportunities and incentives for managers of power producing corporations to 
externalize pollution costs rather than improve on ecoefficiency (Prechel 2009, 
forthcoming).         
 
                                                 
2
 In accordance with the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (Able 1999; Energy 
Information Administration 1993), the U.S. SEC regulated mergers and diversification proposals 
by interstate public utility holding companies with subsidiaries engaging in retail electricity or 
natural gas distribution. The U.S. SEC also regulated the selling and purchasing of securities. 
Utility holding companies operating within one state or a contiguous state could qualify for 
exemptions from regulation by the U.S. SEC under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 
1935.            
 
3
 The study period for the analysis in this dissertation is the year 2004 when President George 
W. Bush and the U.S. Congress were in process of enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that 
completely repealed the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and formally ended 
regulation of utility parent companies by the U.S. SEC (Congressional Research Service 2006). 
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Although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and 1990 address several 
pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) that are emitted by power plants, 
electrical power generation remains one of the worst sources of air pollution in 
the United States (Black Leadership Forum 2002; National Resources Defense 
Council 2006; Schneider 2001). Campaign financing and the larger system of 
business-government relations have allowed corporate polluters to limit and 
delay the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act by creating loopholes, gutting 
regulations, and undermining enforcement (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 
1992). Also, environmentalists and public health advocates criticize the New 
Source Review exemptions that allow power producers to avoid pollution 
abatement upgrades at their oldest power plants. These facilities typically are 
the worst polluters and the most likely to burden racial-ethnic minorities and 
other disadvantaged communities (Gauna, O‘Neill, and Rechtschaffer 2005; 
Levy and Spengler 2001; Levy, Greco, and Spengler 2002).  
 
Community-Level Analysis: Environmental Justice and Local Resistance 
to Pollution 
 
Environmental Justice and Theories of Environmental Inequality 
 
An environmental justice movement arose across the United States over the 
course of recent decades (Bullard 1994, 2001; Faber 1998, 2008; Schlosberg 
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2002; Taylor 2000). The movement seeks to remedy environmental inequality 
and especially environmental racism. Bullard (1996, p. 497) defines 
environmental racism as: ―any policy, practice or directive that differentially 
affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, 
or communities based on race or color.‖ Environmental justice advocates argue 
that environmental racism protects and enhances the quality lifestyles enjoyed 
by affluent Whites and causes the disparities suffered by people of color (Bryant 
1995; Bullard 1993a; Getches and Pellow 2002; Grossman 1994; Lee 1992; 
Mohai and Bryant 1992). 
 
Landmark studies on environmental inequality by the U.S. GAO (1983) and the 
Commission for Racial Justice (1987) identify racial disparities involving 
geographic distributions of hazardous waste facilities. Environmental justice 
advocates since have emphasized that their concerns involve much more than 
waste facilities (Bullard 1996). Research on environmental inequality has 
addressed many other types and sources of pollution (Black Leadership Forum 
2002; Bryant and Mohai 1992; Bullard 1994; Gould, Schnaiberg, and Weinberg 
1996; Stretesky and Lynch 1999). This line of research suggests that 
environmental inequalities born by racial-ethnic minorities and other 
disadvantaged populations can result from multiple causal factors and can 
assume many different forms.  
 
15 
 
The literature discusses various theories that address different forms of 
environmental inequality (Bruelle and Pellow 2006; Liu 2001; Mohai and Saha 
1994, Pellow 2000; Pellow, Weinberg, and Schnaiberg 2001; Saha and Mohai 
1997). Saha and Mohai (2005) concisely summarize the leading theories in 
terms of three basic models: the racial discrimination model, the path of least 
resistance model, and the rational choice model. These theoretical models are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive and can be complementary in situations 
where each provides a partial explanation for environmental inequalities (Saha 
and Mohai 2005). Nonetheless, the underlying themes and the central concepts 
differ substantially.  
 
Proponents of the racial discrimination model have alleged that decision makers 
in industry and government target minority communities with pollution. They 
have based their argument on the long history of racial discrimination in the 
United States (Bullard 1993b; Bullard and Johnson 1997; Bullard, Johnson, and 
Torres 2000; Lerner 2005; Pulido 2000). Early attention on racial injustices 
involving pollution focused within the southeastern United States (Bullard 1983; 
Geiser and Waneck 1983; U.S. GAO 1983). Environmental justice advocates 
coined the term environmental racism in response to these studies and the 
classic study by the Commission for Racial Justice (1987) that identified racial 
composition as the most important factor explaining the presence of hazardous 
waste facilities in communities across the nation. Research then showed that 
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minorities are disproportionately burdened by many different hazards throughout 
the country (Bryant and Mohai 1992; Bullard 1993b, 1994; Goldman 1993). The 
central claim that emerged from the early literature is that communities of color 
suffer more from pollution than do White communities. Environmental justice 
advocates have continued to advance this argument in the 21st century (Bullard 
2001, 2005; Bullard et al. 2007; Checker 2005; Pulido 2000; Ringquist 2005)4.     
 
Even the leading proponents of the racism argument acknowledge that 
environmental inequalities can involve more than just race (Bullard 1996). The 
sociopolitical model, which is supported by Saha and Mohai (2005), suggests 
that minority communities and other distressed communities (i.e., poor White 
communities) bear the brunt of pollution because they lack the ability to resist. 
Low-income communities in general have little social capital and political power 
compared to affluent White communities (Bullard 1990; Mohai and Bryant 1992). 
These vulnerable communities have few resources and present a path of least 
resistance to decision makers in industry and government (Sahai and Mohai 
2005). There is much evidence supporting this argument that shows distressed 
communities, some composed of Whites, bear the burdens of pollution and 
degradation unequally (Cable 1993; Fox 1999; Szasz 2003). For example, Gibbs 
(2002) reviews evidence from documents (Cerrell Associates 1984; Farren 
                                                 
4
 Leading environmental justice advocate Robert D. Bullard is the Director of the Environmental 
Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University. The center provides much information with 
in-depth historical evaluation of the environmental justice movement. It has an extensive 
catalogue of evidence that supports the environmental racism argument. This information can be 
accessed on-line at: http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/   
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1992) that demonstrates clearly how decision-makers base their choices of 
where to site hazardous facilities specifically on the demography of the poor and 
powerless communities that are least likely to resist.  
 
Lastly, the rational choice model of environmental decision making offers an 
alternative explanation for inequalities involving the siting and location of 
hazardous facilities (Been 1993; Liu 2001; Saha and Mohai 2005). The model 
places emphasis on legally legitimate market rationality involving the ecological 
competition for land use (Been 1994; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Mohai and 
Saha 1994; Portney 1991). Accordingly, hazardous facilities are located in low-
cost areas where poor and minority populations tend to live because such areas 
provide the most efficient locations for rational decision makers in the siting 
process. Communities in areas with low land costs therefore can attract 
hazardous facilities and poor minorities simultaneously, and further declines in 
local property values after the facilities are established can attract more poor 
and minority people to the communities (Been 1993, 1994; Been and Gupta 
1997; Rogers 1995). 
 
Saha and Mohai (2005) focus primarily on summarizing how these models 
explain the siting of new hazardous facilities. This dissertation assesses how 
well they explain variations in pollution emitted by existing facilities. The 
community hypotheses elaborated in Chapter II include demographic indicators 
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of race, poverty, and property values to test the relative merits of the models in 
this regard.  
 
The Limits of Civil Rights Remedies and the Persistence of Environmental 
Inequality  
 
Environmental justice received considerable attention from policy scholars 
during the 1990s (Foreman 1998). President George H.W. Bush first 
acknowledged environmental inequality as it relates to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in terms of equal protection and equal application of laws and 
regulations. An Office of Environmental Equity was established in the U.S. EPA 
under his administration. President Clinton then signed Executive Order 12898 
(1994) that instructed all federal agencies to develop strategies for identifying 
and addressing environmental inequalities that adversely affect minority and 
low-income populations. The accompanying federal memorandum encouraged 
using Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the disparate impact standard of 
legality to remedy environmental inequalities that adversely affect racial-ethnic 
minorities (Clinton 1994). The theoretical and legal implications are important 
potentially (Bryner 2002; Bullard 2005; Cole 2002; U.S. EPA 1998).    
 
Title VI and the disparate impact standard strengthen the legal strategies of 
environmental justice advocates – at least potentially – by blurring the causal 
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differences that distinguish the contending theories of environmental inequality. 
Regardless of the different causal explanations, minority plaintiffs in 
environmental justice cases would have to show only that they suffer an adverse 
disparity for the legal burden of proof to shift onto the defendant to justify the 
decision that led to the disparity and show that there was no less discriminatory 
alternative (Bryner 2002; Cole 2002). Environmental justice advocates have 
focused much attention on the disparate impact standard because minority 
plaintiffs would no longer have to meet the difficult legal burden of proving 
discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant in environmental justice cases 
(Bryner 2002; Cole 2002).  
 
These civil rights strategies apply potentially for disparities involving either the 
siting of new hazardous facilities or the abatement of pollution at existing 
facilities (Lee 1997). In actual practice, however, attempts to use Title VI and the 
disparate impact standard to remedy such disparities by suing in federal court or 
filing administrative actions with the U.S. EPA have been unsuccessful (Benford 
2005; Gauna et al. 2005; Gordon and Harley 2005; Harden 2002). Moreover, 
leading environmental justice advocates have found that some of the most 
widely referenced environmental disparities that these strategies were expected 
to remedy have persisted over time and perhaps gotten worse (Bullard et al. 
2007; Goldman and Fitton 1994).  
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Local Organizing Capacity as a Deterrent to Environmental Pollution 
 
Saha and Mohai (2005) suggest that disparities persist because of local-based 
environmental organizing by affluent Whites since the 1970s. Accordingly, 
minority communities had limited ability to resist unwanted facilities in the 1970s, 
1980s, and even 1990s because local environmental organizing by people of 
color developed relatively late. Other scholars suggest further that environmental 
justice advocates must focus more attention on organizing minority communities 
and working with environmental organizations to assist communities that do not 
share in the promise of equal environmental quality (Gordon and Harley 2005). 
These insights indicate that it is important to examine variations in local 
organizing capacity as an explanatory factor in studies that address 
environmental inequality.  
 
Many scholars in the broader environmental sociology and social movement 
literature also have recognized the relevance of local-based organizations 
(Almeida 1994; Brulle 1996; Edwards 1995; Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992). 
For example, Cable and Benson (1993) draw attention to local organizations in 
their critical evaluation of corporate crimes, polluting facilities, and the state. 
Accordingly, an informal control system of local organizations has emerged 
because the state struggles to protect citizens from local polluters. These 
insights are relevant here because they suggest that the government is limited in 
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its capacity to regulate powerful corporate polluters and that non-profit 
organizations play a potentially important role in deterring pollution at the local-
community level. Different scholars who subscribe to basic tenets of the 
sociopolitical model tend to agree (Fox 1999; Gibbs 2002; Kebede 2005; Pellow 
2000, 2001).  
 
Finally, the emphasis on local-based organizations brings the discussion back to 
ecostructural theory. Drawing from the literature on social capital and local civic 
engagement (Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin 1998), ecostructural theorists suggest 
that scholars studying the effects of organizations on the environment must 
consider more than just the structural characteristics of the polluters (Grant et al. 
2004). Accordingly, communities have organizational structures that can 
cultivate local problem solving capacities and thereby influence the behavior of 
the polluters. Although Grant et al. (2004) find no direct relationship between 
environmental pollution and community organization, they find significant 
interaction effects involving several indicators of local organizational capacity 
(i.e., the number of associations, number of churches, and number of third 
places5). The important point here is that ecostructural theorists as well as 
environmental justice scholars have recognized the potential deterrent effects 
that local organizations can have on pollution.  
                                                 
5
 Third places are places separated from the home and the workplace that facilitate community 
solidarity and civic engagement. Grant et al. (2004, p. 194) mention the ―barber shops, cafes, 
and other sites of informal public life‖ when discussing third places.  
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Environmental Inequality Involving Air Pollution and the Electrical Power Industry 
 
Environmental justice advocates have long argued that racial-ethnic minorities, 
and poor Whites, are disproportionately vulnerable to health risks from air 
pollution because of disproportionate exposure (Bullard 1994; Creech and 
Brown 2000; Ferris 1994; Jarrell and Ozymy 2010; Lopez 2002; Maantay 2007; 
Pastor, Morello-Frosch, and Sadd 2005). They also have focused on electrical 
power generation as a major source of air pollution (Black Leadership Forum 
2002; Sze 2005). However, environmental justice advocates have not conducted 
a national study that examines power plant emissions rates in relation to either 
the characteristics of corporations that own power plants or the characteristics of 
communities where power plants are located. This dissertation addresses these 
gaps in the literature by examining the effects of both corporate and community 
characteristics on rates of air pollution emitted by power plants located across 
the United States. 
 
A classic national study by Wernette and Nieves (1992) at Argonne National 
Laboratory focused on air pollution by examining all counties and independent 
cities designated as non-attainment areas under the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) that are established by the U.S. EPA in accordance 
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with the Clean Air Act6. The findings showed that the percentages of the Black 
and Hispanic populations living in the NAAQS non-attainment areas were 
greater than the percentage of the non-Hispanic White population living in the 
non-attainment areas and also greater than the percentage of the whole 
population (from all racial-ethnic groups) with income below poverty living in the 
non-attainment areas. These findings indicate that minorities are exposed 
disproportionately to air pollution and that their disproportionate exposure cannot 
be reduced simply to factors of poverty and income (Wernette and Nieves 1992).   
 
Environmental justice advocates and other researchers since have conducted 
many studies that examine various forms of air pollution7. Some studies focus 
nationwide (Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Grant et al. 
2002; Grant et al. 2010; Perlin, Setzer, Creason, and Sexton 1995), and others 
focus within different regions (Downey 1998; Grineski, Bolin, and Boone 2007; 
Kriesel and Centner 1996; Pastor et al. 2005; Touch  and Rogers 2005). Some 
of these studies examine cumulative distributions of air pollution from multiple 
sources (Daniels and Friedman 1999; Downey 1998; Pastor et al. 2005), and 
                                                 
6
 The U.S. EPA has established NAAQS for several criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act. 
Specified criteria pollutants include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, ground-
level ozone, carbon monoxide, and lead. The U.S. EPA also is responsible for identifying areas 
that have excess levels of these criteria pollutants. These areas are referred to as NAAQS non-
attainment areas. Further information on NAAQS is available on the website of the U.S. EPA at: 
http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html  
 
7
 The total body of research examining ambient air pollution in relation to demographic 
characteristics includes many studies that focus on Clean Air Act criteria pollutants and many 
different studies that focus on other pollutants included in the U.S. EPA Toxics Release 
Inventory.      
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others examine rates of air pollution emitted by specific types of facilities (Grant 
et al. 2002; Grant et al. 2010; Touch  and Rogers 2005).     
 
The results and findings of these and other air-pollution studies are mixed. The 
early ecostructural studies do not find demographic inequalities involving facility 
emissions rates in the chemical industry (Grant et al. 2002; Grant and Jones 
2003). However, much research indicates that there are inequalities involving 
various forms of air pollution and the demographic characteristics examined in 
this dissertation.  
 
Many studies find that air pollution is significantly related to race, poverty, and 
sometimes both these factors (Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 
1999; Maantay 2007; McCaull 1976; Pastor et al. 2005). Many studies also find 
that air pollution is significantly related to property values (Brooks and Sethi 
1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Jerrett, Burnett, Kanaroglou, Eyles, 
Finkelstein, Giovis, and Brook 2001; Touch  and Rogers 2005 . Some of these 
studies suggest that quadratic terms should be included when explaining air 
pollution inequalities (Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; 
Pastor et al. 2005). Accordingly, poverty and income variables have curvilinear 
relationships with air pollution. The analysis in this dissertation thus includes a 
squared term for poverty to test for a quadratic relationship and identify the 
threshold value at which the effect of poverty on power plant emissions rates 
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becomes positive. The point taken from this broad literature is that the 
demographic characteristics examined in this dissertation relate significantly to 
air pollution in general.   
 
A national report by the Black Leadership Forum (2002) focuses specifically on 
power plants as principal emitters of air pollution. The report finds that a greater 
percentage of Blacks compared to Whites live within 30 miles of a power plant. It 
also stresses that the maximum effects of the pollution occur within this distance 
(Black Leadership Forum 2002). Indeed, research at the Harvard School of 
Public Health indicates that air concentrations of SO2 and primary particulate 
matter are greatest within five miles of power plants (Levy and Spengler 2000). 
This research indicates further that per capita health risks of these pollutants are 
greatest near power plants and decrease with distance from power plants (Levy 
and Spengler 2000). Associated research at the Clean Air Task Force also 
recognizes that communities in close proximities to power plants are directly 
affected by air pollutants (i.e., SO2) emitted by power plants (Hill and Baum 
2001). 
 
There are two problems with the national report by the Black Leadership Forum 
(2002). First, the report is limited because it merely points out that a relatively 
large percentage of the Black population – a small population compared to the 
White population – lives in geographic areas around power plants. It does not 
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examine air pollution emitted by power plants in relation to demographic 
characteristics of areas around power plants. In other words, it does not address 
the question of whether power plants located in geographic areas where Blacks 
are concentrated emit air pollution at higher rates than power plants located in 
areas inhabited mostly by Whites.      
 
The second and more fundamental problem is that the Black Leadership Forum 
(2002) does not observe the specific communities where the power plants are 
located. This is an important point that involves sources of pollution other than 
just power plants. The basic problem follows in accordance with the geo-unit 
debates that received prominent attention in the literature after Anderton, 
Anderson, Rossi, Oakes, Fraser, Weber, and Calabrese (1994) showed that a 
relatively minor geo-unit size change from zip codes to census tracts results in 
different demographic findings when examining communities where waste 
facilities are located. The much larger areas (i.e., 60 miles in diameter) 
examined by the Black Leadership Forum (2002) are subject to criticisms of 
ecological fallacies involving population aggregations, which have long been 
recognized as problematic by sociologists and demographers (Anderton et al. 
1994; Robinson 1950).     
 
A widely referenced report by the Institute of Medicine (1999) at the National 
Academies addresses the basic problem by recommending that researchers 
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examine the specific communities where specific hazards of interest are located 
and characterize the nature and severity of risk exposure by direct measurement 
or estimation. Accordingly, assertions of environmental inequalities are well 
founded and warrant careful assessment (Institute of Medicine 1999). This 
dissertation moves beyond the limits and problems of the Black Leadership 
Forum (2002) in these regards. Although this national study does not directly 
observe risk exposures and health effects, it does examine the demographic 
characteristics of the specific communities where the power plants are located in 
relation to rates of air pollution emitted by the power plants.   
 
A previous study by Touch  and Rogers (2005) examines 28 communities in 
Texas that were sited with coal and gas power plants between 1970 and 1990. 
The study is relevant because Texas is an energy-producing state that has a 
high aggregate level of air pollution from electrical power generation and a large 
population of minorities. Nonetheless, the study finds no disparities adversely 
affecting minority communities in either its longitudinal analysis of power plant 
sitings or its cross-sectional analysis of power plant emissions rates (Touch  
and Rogers 2005). The analysis, however, does not include many older power 
plants that were established in earlier decades. This is important because of the 
New Source Review exemptions to the Clean Air Act that allow older power 
plants to avoid pollution abatement upgrades. Such old facilities are most likely 
to burden communities with a high proportion of disadvantaged citizens (Levy 
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and Spengler 2001; Levy et al. 2002; Gauna et al. 2005). Also, cases outside of 
Texas suggest that post-1990 energy deregulation has caused disparities 
involving more recently established power plants (Sze 2005).  
 
The examination here includes fossil-fuel plants (i.e., coal, natural gas, and oil) 
regardless of age that are located in many different communities across the 
continental United States. This multilevel research contributes to the literature in 
several ways. First, it moves beyond previous environmental justice research by 
examining characteristics of the corporations that own the facilities. Second, it 
examines variations in local organizing capacity as well as variations in the 
demography of the local communities. Third, it controls for several facility 
characteristics that otherwise could bias the findings. The control variables are 
discussed in the next chapter after the theoretical framework is summarized and 
the hypotheses are elaborated.    
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CHAPTER II 
CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY HYPOTHESES 
 
There are two sets of hypotheses. The first set addresses the first research 
question by examining the effects of corporate characteristics on power plant 
emissions rates. The second set addresses the second research question by 
examining the effects of local community characteristics on power plant 
emissions rates. The opening section of this chapter follows the previous 
chapter by briefly summarizing the theoretical framework from which the 
hypotheses are derived.     
 
SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Ecostructural theory provides the conceptual basis for the corporate analysis. 
This theory focuses on organizations and the effects of organizational structures 
on environmental pollution (Grant et al. 2002). Recent developments of 
ecostructural theory (Prechel 2009, forthcoming; Prechel and Zheng 2009) draw 
from resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salanik 1978) and the 
shareholder conception of value (Krier 2005; Useem 1996).  
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that organizations are externally 
constrained and controlled by inter-organizational resource dependencies and 
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that under certain conditions they can respond actively by changing their 
structures and recreating their networks of interdependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salanik 1978). This theory also suggests that new resource dependencies can 
emerge when organizations cope with previous resource dependencies (Pfeffer 
and Salanik 1978). Previous research on capital dependence shows that the 
contemporary transformation in corporate form and the increased dependence 
of corporations on investing shareholders have created opportunities and 
incentives that explain financial malfeasance (Prechel 2003; Prechel and Morris 
2010). 
 
The dissertation here follows in accordance with resource dependence theory 
and the ecostructural theory elaborated by Prechel (2009, forthcoming) to 
specify how the organizational structure and financial characteristics of 
corporations create dependencies, opportunities, and incentives that affect 
ecoefficiency. This multilevel examination addresses ecoefficiency by examining 
power plant emissions rates. Power plants that emit less pollution and generate 
more electricity are more ecoefficient than power plants that emit more pollution 
and generate less electricity.  
 
The examination of the local communities follows from the three theoretical 
models summarized by Saha and Mohai (2005). The elaboration of hypotheses 
addresses the racial discrimination model first because environmental justice 
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and civil rights advocates have argued most forcefully that – whether intended or 
unintended – minority communities bear a disproportionate share of pollution. 
The local community hypotheses then address the rational choice model and the 
sociopolitical model, which suggests that minority and other distressed groups 
bear the burdens of pollution unequally because they have little capacity to 
resist.       
 
SPECIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES 
 
The following sections elaborate the corporate and the community hypotheses. 
The specification of characteristics used to test the corporate hypotheses 
precedes the specification of characteristics used to test the local community 
hypotheses. Several facility control variables are specified at the end of this 
chapter.     
 
Corporate Characteristics 
 
There are three corporate characteristics. The first of these hypotheses focuses 
on corporate size. The second and third corporate hypotheses focus on 
structural and financial characteristics that involve the multilayer-subsidiary form 
and the shareholder conception of value.   
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Corporate Size 
 
Organizational size is an important characteristic in ecostructural research. After 
all, firm size is the only corporate characteristic included in the early study by 
Grant et al. (2002) that examines facility emissions rates in the chemical 
industry. Although they focus primarily on the relationship between facility size 
and facility emissions rates, the model they consider best in their analysis shows 
that firm size also has a significant positive effect on the rates at which chemical 
facilities emit toxic air pollution (Grant et al. 2002).     
 
However, theoretical disagreement exists about the relationship between 
organizational size and environmental pollution. Whereas the work of some 
organizational theorists suggests that pollution rates would be higher in larger 
organizations (Mokhiber and Weissman 1999; Perrow 1997), other theorists 
suggest that larger organizations with more resources would have lower 
pollution rates (Hamilton 1995). Recent ecostructural research examining rates 
of toxic emissions that are aggregated up to the ultimate parent company finds 
that larger corporations are more ecoefficient than are smaller corporations 
(Prechel 2009; Prechel and Zheng 2009).  
 
The first hypothesis in this dissertation tests the effects of corporate assets on 
facility emissions rates in the electrical power industry. Explaining emissions 
33 
 
rates at the facilities is fundamentally important because, as shown later in the 
dissertation, much of the variation in pollution exists at the facility level. The 
direction of the hypothesis follows Grant et al. (2002) since they also explain 
pollution rates at the facility level as they demonstrate the effects of size – firm 
size and facility size – on facility emissions rates. The hypothesis is stated as 
follows:          
 
Hypothesis 1: The total corporate assets are positively related to power 
plant emissions rates.   
 
Corporate Form     
 
Recent developments of ecostructural theory focus on meso-organizational 
characteristics other than corporate size (Prechel forthcoming; Prechel and 
Zheng 2009). Previous research in organizational and political sociology 
demonstrates that the multilayer-subsidiary form has been widely adopted in 
corporate America (Boies and Prechel 2002). This line of research also shows 
that this corporate form allows and encourages managers to engage in financial 
malfeasance (Prechel 2003; Prechel and Morris 2010).  
 
Ecostructural theory suggests that the multilayer-subsidiary form creates 
dependencies, opportunities, and incentives for managers to externalize 
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pollution costs (Prechel forthcoming). Business law treats a subsidiary as a 
separate entity from its parent company even if all its stock is owned by its 
parent company and all managers serving on its board of directors serve on the 
board of directors for its parent company (Allison, Prentice, and Howell 1991). 
This separation creates liability firewalls, which Prechel (2000, p. 54) defines as 
―barriers among legally independent subsidiary corporations and the parent 
company.‖ Parent companies are shielded from risks in the subsidiaries because 
the courts rarely pierce this corporate veil. As noted by Prechel (1997, p. 497), 
the ―corporate veil protects the parent company‘s assets by containing economic 
losses, bankruptcy, and tort liability lawsuits to the subsidiary corporation.‖ This 
is important for ecostructural theory since parent companies are protected from 
liabilities involving polluting activities in their subsidiaries (Prechel forthcoming). 
 
Ecostructural theory further emphasizes the overall structural complexity of the 
multilayer-subsidiary form (Prechel 2009; Prechel and Zheng 2009). 
Corporations in the multilayer-subsidiary form are structured such that lower 
levels of subsidiaries are embedded under higher levels of subsidiaries that 
finally are embedded directly under the ultimate parent company at the top of the 
corporate structure (Prechel 1997, 2000). Ecostructural theorists argue that this 
type of structural complexity makes corporations less ecoefficient (Prechel and 
Zheng 2009).  
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The second hypothesis tests the complexity argument by focusing on the total 
number of subsidiaries in the corporate structure. Research focusing specifically 
on the electrical power industry has shown that there is a positive relationship 
between the total number of subsidiaries in the corporate structure and 
corporate pollution (Prechel forthcoming). This multilevel examination expects to 
find that the total number of subsidiaries also has contextual effects that explain 
facility emissions rates. Therefore,     
 
Hypothesis 2: The total number of subsidiaries in the corporate structure is 
positively related to power plant emissions rates.    
 
Corporate Dependence on Shareholders 
 
The shareholder conception of value (Krier 2005; Useem 1996) is a considered 
a resource constraint within the framework of this dissertation. Corporate 
ownership has become concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors 
who actively pressure corporate management to improve stock performance and 
increase returns to shareholders (Useem 1996). Executive compensation and 
succession have become contingently aligned with the expansion of shareholder 
wealth (Useem 1996). The corporate executives and the institutional investors 
now share opportunistic incentives and speculative interests in short-term 
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investment trends that are not in accordance with the overall long-term good 
(Krier 2005). 
 
Environmental sociologists critical of economic organizations have suggested 
that the volatility in contemporary patterns of investment and capital 
accumulation creates environmental disruptions (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). 
Ecostructural theory maintains that the equity financing capabilities of 
corporations in the multilayer-subsidiary form have made management more 
dependent on the investors who purchase corporate securities (Prechel 2009, 
forthcoming). Accordingly, this new layer of capital dependence has created 
incentives and opportunities for corporate managers to externalize pollution 
costs. The basic argument here is that the dependence of corporations on 
investors allows and encourages managers to maximize shareholder returns 
rather than invest in pollution abatement technologies.  
 
The third hypothesis examines the multilevel effects of corporate dividend 
payments on facility emissions rates. Recent ecostructural research finds that 
the corporate dividends paid per share relate positively to corporate pollution 
(Prechel 2009; forthcoming). The examination here expects to find that the 
corporate dividends paid per share also have a significant positive effect on 
facility emissions rates.        
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Hypothesis 3: The corporate dividends paid per share are positively 
related to power plant emissions rates. 
 
Local Community Characteristics  
 
There are four local community characteristics. The first three community 
hypotheses focus on demographic characteristics. Specifically, they focus on 
racial composition, poverty, and property values. The fourth of these hypotheses 
focuses on local non-profit organizations.  
  
The elaboration of these hypotheses follows from the theoretical models 
summarized in the previous chapter: the racial discrimination model, 
sociopolitical model, and rational choice model. The elaboration here differs from 
Saha and Mohai (2005) in that it assesses how these models explain the 
unequal abatement of pollution at existing facilities instead of evaluating how 
they explain inequalities involving the siting of new hazardous facilities.  
  
Minority Communities  
 
Environmental justice advocates cite a classic study by Lavelle and Coyle (1992) 
as they argue that environmental inequalities involve more than just the siting of 
hazardous facilities (Bullard 1994, 2001; Checker 2005; Getches and Pellow 
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2002). The findings of Lavelle and Coyle (1992) indicate that racial disparities 
involving the mitigation and regulation of environmental risks at waste facilities 
continue long after the facilities are initially established. The findings also 
indicate that that the racially unequal environmental protection often occurs 
regardless of whether the local communities are wealthy or poor (Lavelle and 
Coyle 1992).  
 
The racial discrimination model offers perhaps the best theoretical explanation 
for findings such as those reported by Lavelle and Coyle (1992). However, the 
civil rights strategies advanced by environmental justice advocates blur the 
causal reasoning because discriminatory intent can be very difficult to prove 
legally (Bryner 2002; Bullard 2001; Cole 2002 . Bullard‘s (1996, p. 497) words 
―whether intended or unintended‖ in his definition of environmental racism follow 
in accordance with the Clinton (1994) federal memorandum on Title VI and the 
attempts by environmental justice advocates – though not yet successful – to 
apply the disparate impact standard in cases where the environmental 
disparities adversely affect racial-ethnic minorities (Bryner 2002; Cole 2002; Lee 
1997).    
 
Environmental justice advocates argue that minorities suffer disproportionately 
from air pollution in general (Bullard 1994; Creech and Brown 2000; Lopez 2002; 
Maantay 2007; Pastor et al. 2005; Wernette and Nieves 1992). The national 
39 
 
report Air of Injustice by the Black Leadership Forum (2002) points out that a 
relatively large percentage of Blacks live in areas around power plants where 
maximum effects of the emissions typically occur. Although the study by Touch  
and Rogers (2005) finds no adverse racial-ethnic disparities involving power 
plant emissions rates in Texas, the analysis only includes power plants that were 
established between 1970 and 1990. Environmental justice advocates and other 
researchers indicate that the New Source Review exemptions to the Clean Air 
Act and the post-1990 energy deregulation have created inequalities involving 
both older and newer facilities (Levy and Spengler 2001; Levy et al. 2002; 
Gauna et al. 2005; Sze 2005). Following the Black Leadership Forum (2002), 
the fourth hypothesis is stated as follows:     
 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of the community that is Black is positively 
related to power plant emissions rates. 
 
Poor Communities  
 
Environmental justice advocates acknowledge that poor populations other than 
racial-ethnic minorities (i.e., poor Whites) can experience environmental 
inequality (Bullard 1996; Saha and Mohai 2005). After all, low-income 
populations are included with minority populations in President Clinton‘s 
Executive Order 12898 (1994). From the iconic case of toxic waste pollution at 
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Love Canal (Gibbs 2002; Szasz 2003) to the poverty and degradation in 
Appalachia (Cable 1993; Fisher 1993; Fox 1999), the literature recognizes that 
the environmental inequities experienced by economically disadvantaged White 
communities need to be addressed.      
 
The sociopolitical model summarized by Saha and Mohai (2005) logically 
explains the environmental inequities born by poor people. The path of least 
resistance theory underpinning the model posits that low-income populations, 
poor Whites and poor minorities, have little influence on environmental decision 
making because they lack social capital and political power in general and are 
underrepresented throughout industry and government (Gibbs 2002; Mohai and 
Bryant 1992). Compared to affluent Whites, poor people simply have less 
capacity to oppose those responsible for polluting their communities.  
 
Environmental justice advocates include low-income populations among the 
disadvantaged groups that suffer because of power plants and other sources of 
air pollution (Gauna et al. 2005; Jerrett et al. 2001; McCaull 1976; Sze 2005). 
This dissertation accepts the theoretical underpinnings of the sociopolitical 
model and logically presumes that poor communities present a path of least 
resistance to managers responsible for abating emissions and regulators 
responsible for enforcing compliance with emissions laws. The fifth hypothesis is 
stated in standard linear form. However, one model in the analysis includes a 
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squared term for poverty because researchers suggest that poverty and income 
variables have quadratic relationships with air pollution (Brooks and Sethi 1997; 
Daniels and Friedman 1999; Pastor et al. 2005). The linear form of the 
hypothesized relationship is expressed as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of the community that is living in poverty is 
positively related to power plant emissions rates. 
 
Community Property Values   
 
The rational choice model embraces the theme of legal-legitimate market 
rationality (Been 1993, 1994; Liu 2001; Portney 1991; Saha and Mohai 2005). 
The model presumes that communities with low land costs simultaneously 
attract industrial decision makers as they select where to site facilities and poor 
minorities as they decide where to reside. The model also addresses post-siting 
demographic changes by recognizing that downward pressures on property 
values after the facilities are established can discourage rich whites from living in 
these communities and encourage poor and minority people to live in these 
communities (Been and Gupta 1997; Rogers 1995; Saha and Mohai 2005). 
 
Such arguments are dubious when it comes to justifying the unequal abatement 
of pollution after the facilities are established because the legal legitimacy 
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assumption underpinning the model no longer stands. Logically, the model could 
be extended by recognizing that communities with the worst polluting facilities 
would have the lowest property values and thus would attract the most low-
income minorities. As stressed by environmental justice advocates, however, 
laws involving the mitigation and regulation of pollution at hazardous facilities 
are supposed to apply equally regardless of the demographic characteristics of 
the communities where facilities are located (Bullard 1994; Bullard and Johnson 
2000; Bullard et al. 2007; Cutter 1995; Ferris 1994; Lavelle and Coyle 1992).      
 
This point is emphasized by Touch  and Rogers (2005) as they discuss their 
findings that indicate local home values in Texas relate negatively to power plant 
emissions rates. Although managers in the power industry have a legal right to 
site new facilities in communities with low property values, they have no legal 
right to violate emission laws at existing facilities that are located in communities 
with low property values. Even if proponents of the rational choice model were to 
argue that it is rational to break laws, such arguments would be contingent on 
socio-political factors to explain why managers break laws at some facilities but 
not at other facilities. All else equal, violating emissions laws at facilities located 
in communities with low property values does not reduce pollution abatement 
costs any more than violating emissions laws at facilities located in communities 
with high property values. The difference is sociopolitical in that low property 
value communities have less capacity to exert pressure on the managers 
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responsible for violating emissions laws and the regulators responsible for 
enforcing compliance with emissions laws. In other words, disregard for 
emissions laws follows the path of least resistance.  
 
This is a sociopolitical explanation more than a rational choice explanation 
because resistance involves the basic concept of power. As argued by many 
organizational and political sociologists, power is conditional and exists in social 
relationships involving more than the standard rational choice factors that center 
on individual calculations of cost efficiency and economic utility (Emerson 1962; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Roy 1997). In accord with the sociopolitical model of 
environmental inequality (Sahai and Mohai 2005), the hypothesis is stated as:  
 
Hypothesis 6: The community property values are negatively related to 
power plant emissions rates. 
 
Local Organizing Capacity 
 
Local organizing capacity is vital in the sociopolitical model because local areas 
with little organizing capacity present a clear path of least resistance. This basic 
reasoning is substantiated by Saha and Mohai (2005) as they discuss the late 
development of environmental organizing by people of color and the persistence 
of disparities involving hazardous facilities. Research on the traditional civil 
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rights movement has long recognized that indigenous organizational strength is 
a key component in the political process (McAdam 1982). It is important for the 
viability of the contemporary environmental justice movement that minorities 
strengthen their organizing capacity and work through environmental 
organizations to oppose those responsible for polluting their communities 
(Gordon and Harley 2005; Saha and Mohai 2005).  
 
Many environmental sociologists and social movement scholars have 
recognized the deterrent effects that local-based organizations can have on 
pollution (Brulle 1996; Cable and Cable 1995; Edwards 1995; Freudenberg and 
Steinsapir 1992; Kebede 2005; Pellow 2001). Regardless of community 
demography (e.g., Black or poor White), these scholars indicate that local 
organizations can make a difference. Their insights suggest that areas with 
relatively few local organizations present a path of least resistance in the 
sociopolitical model.  
 
The classic work of Cable and Benson (1993) that addresses corporate crimes 
involving polluting facilities draws specific attention to local environmental 
organizations. Other scholars indicate that different types of local non-profit 
organizations (e.g., health organizations and community development 
organizations) also can affect environmental pollution and degradation (Almeida 
1994; Brown, Mayer, Zavestoski, Luebke, Mandelbaum, and McCormick 2005; 
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Fischer 1993; Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992). Accordingly, local 
organizations of various kinds serve as headquarters for social movements and 
provide communities with networking opportunities to enhance their social 
capital and strengthen their organizational capacity so that they can effectively 
address social and environmental problems.      
 
This examination focuses on the total number of non-profit organizations in the 
county as an indicator of local organizing capacity. The ecostructural study by 
Grant et al. (2004) also focuses at the county level when drawing from the 
literature on social capital and civic engagement (Tolbert et al. 1998) to study 
the effects of associations, churches, and third places on chemical plant 
emissions rates. The argument here is that communities in counties with 
relatively few non-profit organizations have less capacity to pressure managers 
and regulators to abate pollution.       
 
Hypothesis 7: The total number of non-profit organizations in the county is 
negatively related to power plant emissions rates. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
The research questions stated in Chapter I focus on corporate characteristics 
and local community characteristics. Nevertheless, this examination also 
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includes several power plant characteristics as control variables. Failure to 
account for the potential effects of these facility characteristics on facility 
emissions rates could bias the testing of the corporate and community 
hypotheses.  
 
Facility size is included in the examination because the ecostructural study by 
Grant et al. (2002) shows that large facilities pollute at higher rates than do small 
facilities. Facility age is included as another control variable because the New 
Source Review exemptions to the Clean Air Act allow old facilities to avoid 
pollution abatement upgrades. Also, structural inertia arguments in sociology 
indicate that age, as well as size, can impede change (Hannan and Freeman 
1984). The basic argument is relevant here because it suggests that pollution 
abatement upgrades are more difficult to implement at older and larger facilities 
than at newer and smaller facilities.  
 
In addition, the examination here includes a facility variable to control for the 
percentage of the total electricity generated that is produced from coal. After all, 
environmental scientists generally recognize coal as the fossil fuel most 
responsible for power plant emissions. A dummy variable also is included to 
identify cogeneration facilities that produce a combination of electricity and 
useful heat energy. Environmental scientists recognize this type of facility for 
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being energy efficient and environmentally friendly. Chapter III provides further 
discussion of these variables and their measures.   
 
Finally, this examination includes one local demographic control variable. 
Population density is an important variable in functionalist sociology and human 
ecology. Research on air pollution and environmental inequality has included 
population density as a land-use control variable (Brooks and Sethi 1997; Pastor 
et al. 2005). Accordingly, the clustering of industry, housing, transportation, and 
other land-use activities in high-density areas can affect how local demographic 
characteristics such as race, income, and property values relate to 
environmental pollution.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This dissertation applies a multilevel research design to examine the main 
effects of the corporate characteristics and community characteristics on facility 
emissions rates. The examination focuses on electrical generating power plants 
located across the continental United States. This is a cross-sectional design in 
that emissions rates are observed for one year. Also, the analysis concentrates 
on one specific pollutant of interest – SO2. In all, the multilevel models shown in 
the next chapter explain the main effects of the corporate characteristics and 
community characteristics on rates of SO2 emitted by power plants in the United 
States for the year 2004.   
 
The power plants examined in this multilevel analysis are owned by the largest 
electrical power-producing corporations in the United States. These corporations 
(i.e., ultimate parent companies) are defined as those with 49 as their primary 
two-digit SIC code, as identified by Compustat. This two-digit SIC code includes 
electric, gas, and sanitary services8. Closer inspection of three-digit and four-
digit SIC codes indicates that the corporations in this analysis have their primary 
                                                 
8
 No corporation with a 49 primary two-digit SIC code in this analysis has a 495 three-digit SIC 
code classification for sanitary services. Although some large and profitable corporations with 
primary lines of business in sanitary services own facilities that generate electricity, no sanitary 
service corporation generates enough electricity at its facilities to be included by the data source 
as one of the largest power-producers in the United States (National Resource Defense Council 
2006).    
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lines of business concentrated in electric and gas services9. These large energy-
producing corporations dominate much of the electrical power industry10. This 
industry is widely recognized as one of the most economically important and 
environmentally polluting industries in the United States (Bent, Orr, and Baker 
2002; Fox-Penner 1997; Sze 2005). 
 
THE STUDY GROUP 
 
The study group comes from a larger study population defined by the National 
Resource Defense Council (NRDC) that includes all power plant facilities owned 
by the 100 largest power producers in the United States. These power plants are 
responsible for almost 90 percent of all electricity generation and air emissions 
in the electrical power industry (NRDC 2006)11. The NRDC has compiled 
separate biannual data sets that account for mergers, acquisitions, and changes 
in facility ownership over two year periods to identify the power plants owned by 
                                                 
9
 The primary three-digit SIC codes of the corporations in this multilevel analysis include 491 
(electrical services), 492 (gas production and distribution), 493 (combined utility services), and 
499 (cogeneration). Further inspection of secondary three-digit SIC codes indicates that most of 
the corporations have business activities in more than one of these sub-classification areas.    
 
10
 This dissertation recognizes that energy-producing corporations with different three-digit SIC 
codes might tend to use different fossil fuels to generate electricity at their power plants. As the 
multi-level analysis explains emissions rates at the facility level, variables are included at the 
facility level to control for variations in the fuel mix across facilities and for whether or not a 
facility engages in cogeneration.      
 
11
 The NRDC 2006 biannual report discusses in detail the methodological and technical specifics 
of how the NRDC benchmarks the air emissions of the 100 largest power producers for base 
year 2004 (NRDC 2006). The NRDC has similar 2004 and 2008 biannual benchmarking reports 
that correspond to the NRDC data sets for base years 2002 and 2006, respectively.    
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the 100 largest power producers. At the time of this analysis12, the NRDC 
website had made publicly available separate biannual data sets that benchmark 
the air emissions of the top 100 power producers for base years 2002, 2004, 
and 2006. The dissertation uses the 2004 data set13.    
 
Only fossil-fuel power plants are included in the study group because there are 
no SO2 emissions from electricity generated using other major energy sources 
such as hydrological power and nuclear power. Electrical generating facilities 
that are owned by top 100 power producers but do not generate 100 percent of 
their electricity from fossil fuels (i.e., coal, natural gas, and oil) thus are 
excluded. The study group also excludes any facility not recorded for the year 
2004 in the Acid Rain Program facility unit database at the Clean Air Markets – 
Data and Maps section of the U.S. EPA website14. The NRDC indicates that 
emissions information reported in the Acid Rain database account for nearly all 
of the SO2 emissions by the 100 largest power producers in 2004 (NRDC 
2006)15. The NRDC stresses that the emissions information in this database is 
                                                 
12
 The NRDC since has made publicly available a 2010 biannual report with a corresponding 
data set benchmarking the air emissions of the 100 largest power producers for base year 2008.  
  
13
 The 2004 data set is used because 2004 is closer than 2006 to the 2000 Census and because 
the 2004 data improve on general methodological and technical issues involving the 2002 data.  
 
14
 For instance, fossil-fuel power plants ultimately owned by the top 100 power producer 
Hawaiian Electric Industries that otherwise would be included in the study group are excluded 
because facilities in Hawaii are not reported in the Acid Rain Program facility unit database at 
the Clean Air Markets – Data and Maps section of the U.S. EPA website.   
  
15
 The NRDC (2006) indicates that, in total, approximately 2 percent of SO2 emissions assigned 
to the top 100 power producers are not reported in the U.S. EPA Acid Rain database. Hence, the 
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collected from continuous emissions monitoring systems, which are recognized 
as providing the most reliable emissions information (NRDC 2006).  
 
The study group does include cogeneration facilities that produce a combination 
of electricity and steam or some other useful form of energy. The NRDC adjusts 
the emissions data for such facilities to estimate only the emissions associated 
with electricity generation (NRDC 2006). The NRDC adjustments make the rates 
of SO2 emitted by such facilities comparable to the rates emitted by the other 
facilities in the study group. Nevertheless, the models in the analysis include a 
dummy variable indicating whether a power plant is a cogeneration facility.  
 
As the examination includes only large and publicly traded domestic 
corporations, the study group excludes all power plants owned by governmental 
and other types of organizations that do not have data on corporate-level 
variables tested in the analysis. All facilities owned by foreign corporations and 
corporations with primary two-digit SIC codes other than 49 (e.g., Goldman 
Sachs) are excluded because such corporations are categorically different from 
the energy-producing corporations in the analysis. These other types of 
corporations accumulate most of their capital in different lines of business and 
                                                                                                                                                
NRDC had to collect emissions data for a relatively few facilities from state agencies. This 
analysis excludes such facilities because of questionable reliability standards involving the 
emissions data and because of the methodological problem of identifying the longitude and 
latitude coordinates used to specify the zip codes and census tracts in which the facilities are 
located.          
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are potentially subject to different regulations and capital constraints that can 
affect their organizational structures and their financial statements16.        
 
Finally, the study group excludes any power plant that is partly owned by more 
than one ultimate power producer organization. The NRDC data set lists each 
such power plant multiple times and weights its electricity and emissions data 
according to the proportion of ownership held by each power producer that owns 
any part of the facility. None of these facilities can be assigned to any one 
corporation in the multilevel analysis17. Moreover, some of the parent companies 
with partial ownership in such power plants are types of organizations that are 
excluded from the analysis based on the criteria mentioned in the above 
paragraph.    
 
In all, the study group consists of 536 power plants. These facilities are owned 
by 51 corporate power producers. Each of these corporations owns, on average, 
about 11 of the power plants.   
 
                                                 
16
 Goldman Sachs, for instance, owns facilities that generate enough electricity for the 
corporation to be included among the largest power producers in the United States (NRDC 
2006). Nonetheless, Goldman Sachs has its primary lines of business concentrated in banking 
and financial services. This corporation, unlike the corporations included in the multilevel 
analysis, is subject to government regulations involving commercial and investment banking that 
can affect its organizational structure and its financial statements.      
 
17
 The study group does include any power plant listed by the NRDC multiple times in 
accordance with different facility sub-unit divisions that are owned by the same corporation. For 
each such facility, the analysis aggregates all of the generation and emissions data from the 
different sub-units and then assigns the facility to the one corporation that owns 100 percent of 
the combined facility.    
53 
 
This dissertation defines the study group using the NRDC database instead of 
two other widely used sources. One is the U.S. EPA‘s Toxics Release Inventory, 
which does not include data on SO2 emissions. The next section discusses the 
relevance of this pollutant to the electrical power industry and the regulation of 
facilities in this industry under the Clean Air Act. The other data source is the 
U.S. EPA‘s Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (EGRID , 
which is systematically inaccurate in how it identifies the corporations that own 
the power plant facilities. For example, EGRID uses the 2006 ownership 
structure to identify the facility owners in 2004. Ownership changes between 
2004 and 2006 thus result in EGRID assigning the wrong corporate owners to 
the power plants in 2004. The NRDC database corrects this problem as it 
combines 2004 facility emissions data from the Acid Rain Program in the U.S. 
EPA with 2004 facility generation data from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in the U.S. Department of Energy and then accounts for 
ownership changes so that the 2004 ownership structure accurately identifies 
the owners of the facilities.        
 
VARIABLE MEASURES AND DATA 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables, measures, and data used in this analysis. 
The dependent variable is summarized first. The corporate predictor variables 
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and community predictor variables than are summarized. Lastly, the facility 
control variables and the local demographic control variable are summarized.  
 
Table 3.1. Variable Measures and Data Sources 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Measurement Description 
 
Source 
Dependent Outcome Variable    
Facility SO2 Emissions Rates Log of power plant SO2 emissions rates 
measured as pounds per megawatt hour. 
NRDC 
Level-2 Corporate Predictor 
Variables 
  
Corporate Size Total Assets in millions of dollars (/100). Comp 
Number of Subsidiaries Total number of subsidiaries in corporate 
structure.  
D&B 
Dividends Paid Per Share Common dividends paid divided by number of 
shares. 
Comp 
Level-1 Local Community Predictor 
Variables 
  
Community Percent Black  Percentage of population in community where 
power plant located that is Black. Zip codes and 
census tracts examined separately. 
Census 
Community Percent Families in 
Poverty 
Percentage of families in community where 
power plant located that is in poverty. Zip codes 
and census tracts examined separately. 
Census 
Community Median Home Value  Median home value of specified owner 
occupied housing units in community where 
power plant located (/10,000). Zip codes and 
census tracts examined separately. 
Census 
Local Non-Profit Organizations Log of total number non-profit organizations in 
county where power plant located.  
CCS 
Level-1 Power Plant and Local 
Control Variables 
  
Facility Size Log of power plant megawatt nameplate 
generating capacity. 
EIA 
Facility Age Measured by subtracting from 2004 the year 
that the oldest active or retired generator began 
operating at power plant. 
EIA 
Facility Percent Coal Generation Divide megawatt hours of electricity generated 
from coal by megawatt hours of electricity 
generated from all sources and then multiply by 
100.  
NRDC 
Cogeneration Facility Dummy variable 1 if any generating unit at 
power plant a co-generation unit, 0 otherwise 
EIA 
Local Population Density Person per square mile in county where power 
plant located (/100). 
Census 
 
NRDC is National Resource Defense Council; Comp is Compustat; D&B is Dun and Bradstreet; 
Census is U.S. Census Bureau; CCS is Center for Charitable Statistics; EIA is Energy 
Information Administration in U.S. Department of Energy. 
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Dependent Variable 
 
The SO2 emission rate at the facility level is used as the dependent variable 
because of its importance to domestic environmental policy and the U.S. 
electrical power industry. For decades, the U.S. EPA has concentrated on SO2 
as a criteria pollutant in accordance with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 
Moreover, in accordance with Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
the U.S. EPA administers the Acid Rain Program to reduce SO2 emitted by 
fossil-fuel power plants nationwide18. The two phases of SO2 emission reduction 
requirements under the program together affect power plants located across the 
United States that generate electricity from coal, oil, and natural gas19. The 
Phase I and Phase II requirements have been in place since the years 1995 and 
2000, respectively. Yet, electrical generating facilities are responsible for about 
two-thirds of all SO2 emissions in the United States (Creech and Brown 2000; 
Fox-Penner 1997; Munson 2005; NRDC 2006). 
 
Many scholars have recognized the harms to human health and the natural 
environment caused by power plant SO2 emissions (Fox-Penner 1997; Koenig 
                                                 
18
 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 also created a national cap and trade system 
specifically to reduce SO2 emissions. This nationwide program is considered a model for 
expanding cap and trading systems for nitrogen oxides and other emissions. More information 
on cap and trade systems involving different emissions is available from the Clean Air Markets 
division of the U.S. EPA.     
 
19
 The NRDC (2006) provides a brief summary of Title VI of the Clean Air Act and the two 
phases of SO2 emission reduction requirements for fossil-fuel power plants. Further information 
on the Clean Air Act, the Acid Rain Program, and Phase I and Phase II of the SO2 emission 
reduction requirements is available from the Clean Air Markets division of U.S. EPA. 
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2000; Lee, 2002; Levy and Spengler 2001; Schneider 2001). The environmental 
and public health literature indicates that SO2 emissions directly harm 
communities near power plants (Hill and Baum 2001; Levy and Spengler 2000). 
Accordingly, harmful effects of SO2 on human health include bronchial reactions, 
reduced lung functions, respiratory diseases, cardiovascular diseases, and 
premature deaths. Also, the SO2 contributes to the formation of secondary fine 
particulate matter – commonly referred to as sulfates – that that can cause 
respiratory, pulmonary, and cardiac problems for people living farther downwind 
from the power plants (Lee 2002; Levy and Spengler 2001; Levy et al. 2002). 
The sulfate compounds then mix with water in the atmosphere to form acid 
deposition that can travel hundreds of miles from the source. The SO2, the 
sulfates, and the acid rain also harm the natural and built environments by 
damaging vegetation, eroding soils, impairing crops, killing aquatic life, and 
corroding structures and materials (Hill and Baum 2001; Lee, 2002). 
 
In sum, focusing on SO2 as the dependent variable in this multilevel examination 
is important for several reasons. First, power plants emit more SO2 than any 
other source of air pollution in the United States (Creech and Brown 2000; Fox-
Penner 1997; Munson 2005). Second, power plants owned by the largest power-
producing organizations in the United States are together responsible for most of 
the SO2 emissions in the electrical power industry (NRDC 2006). Third, the 
communities where power plants are located are especially vulnerable to SO2 
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emissions (Hill and Baum 2001); research on environment and public health 
indicates that air concentrations of SO2 and per capita mortality risks from 
exposure to SO2 are greatest near power plants and decrease with distance 
from power plants (Levy and Spengler 2000).   
 
The SO2 dependent variable is calculated from the NRDC data set. For each 
power plant, the NRDC provides the tons of SO2 emitted and the megawatt 
hours of electricity generated in 2004. The SO2 emissions rates are measured 
as pounds emitted per megawatt hour. The analysis reduces skewness by using 
the log of the power plant SO2 emissions rates. Using log transformations to 
reduce skewness in the distribution of the dependent variable is common in 
statistical modeling. For example, Grant et al. (2002) and the other early 
ecostructural studies of the chemical industry (Grant and Jones 2003; Grant et 
al. 2004) take the log form of the facility emissions rates to reduce skewness.  
 
Corporate and Community Predictor Variables 
 
The corporate characteristics are the level-2 variables in the multilevel models. 
The total number of subsidiaries in the parent company is used to measure 
structural complexity. The subsidiary data are from Dun and Bradstreet. This 
data source is the most comprehensive, accurate, and reliable source for data 
on domestic subsidiaries and corporate form (Prechel 2000). The total corporate 
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assets are used to measure corporate size. This measure is consistent with 
previous research that examines corporate characteristics in relation to financial 
malfeasance and environmental pollution (Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel 
forthcoming). The common dividends paid per share are used to measure 
capital dependence on shareholders. This measure is consistent with the recent 
ecostructural research on corporate pollution (Prechel 2009, forthcoming). The 
data used for the corporate size variable and the capital dependence on 
shareholders variable are from Compustat. The analysis uses the 2003 and 
2004 average of these variables to ensure measurement stability in the financial 
data. 
 
All demographic data for the local community characteristics are from the 2000 
Census. In accord with the geo-unit debates initiated by Anderton et al. (1994), 
this dissertation examines five-digit zip codes and census tracts separately as 
two different geo units of analysis. The facility latitude and longitude coordinates 
recorded in the Acid Rain Program facility unit database at the Clean Air Markets 
– Data and Maps section of the U.S. EPA are used with the LandView software 
to identify the zip codes and census tracts for the power plants and to measure 
the community demographic variables. The LandView software is a commonly 
used desktop mapping system that provides a wide range of useful data from 
the U.S. EPA, U.S. Census Bureau, and U.S. Geological Survey.  
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Based on the claims made by the Black Leadership Forum (2002), the racial 
minority variable is measured as the percentage of the community that is Black. 
The poverty variable is measured as the percent families in poverty. The median 
home value of the specified owner occupied housing units is used to measure 
the overall value of property in the community. Finally, the data for the local 
organizing capacity variable are from the Center for Charitable Statistics. This 
variable is measured as the log of the total number of non-profit organizations in 
the county where the power plant is located. Using the log form reduces 
skewness in the distribution of non-profit organizations across counties. This 
measure is consistent with previous ecostructural research (Grant et al. 2004) 
and research on local civic engagement (Tolbert et al. 1998) that reduces 
skewness by using log transformations for similar measures of social capital and 
organizational networking opportunities at the local county level. To ensure 
measurement stability, the organizing capacity measure is based on the average 
number of non-profit organizations in the local county for the years 2003 and 
2004.   
 
Control Variables 
 
Four facility control variables and one local demographic control variable are 
included in the examination. The megawatt generating capacity of the power 
plant in 2004 is used to control for facility size. The year that the oldest active or 
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retired generating unit began operating at the power plant is used to calculate 
facility age. These data are from the EIA in the U.S. Department of Energy. For 
each power plant, the NRDC data are used to calculate the percentage of the 
total electricity generated that is produced from coal. This measure is used to 
control for variations in fossil-fuel mix across the different facilities. The EIA 
databases are used to create the cogeneration facility dummy variable. Any 
power plant with at least one generating unit classified as a cogeneration unit in 
2004 is assigned a value of one. All other power plants are assigned a zero. 
Finally, the control variable for local population density is measured as the 
person per square mile in the county where the power plant is located.  
 
DATA COMPLICATIONS 
 
Several complications in the data are worth mentioning. One complication 
involves three of the 536 power plants that had zero SO2 emissions for the year 
2004. These facilities automatically would have been dropped from the models 
because log transformations are not calculated for observations with a value of 
zero. The analysis retains these three facilities by using the average logged SO2 
emissions rates for years 2003 to 2005. As the NRDC (2006) collects much of its 
generation and emissions data from the EIA in the U.S. Department of Energy 
and the Acid Rain Program in the U.S. EPA, these sources are used to calculate 
the 2003 to 2005 emissions rates averages for the three facilities. Alternative 
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exploratory analyses distinguished these facilities with a dummy variable and 
then simply dropped them as missing values. The results and findings of these 
exploratory analyses were nearly identical to those shown in the next chapter. 
The three power plants do not substantively affect the basic conclusions.           
 
Another complication involves the use of zip codes, census tracts, and counties 
as level-1 variables. The 536 power plants are located in a total of 492 zip 
codes, 503 census tracts, and 395 counties. Hence, there is on average 1.09 
facilities for each zip code, 1.07 facilities for each census tract, and 1.36 facilities 
for each county20. The multilevel models cannot include additional levels 
grouping the facilities by the geo-units because it is the facilities and not the 
surrounding geo-unit areas that are nested in the level-2 corporations. In several 
other exploratory analyses, dummy variables were introduced separately into the 
models to control for zip codes, census tracts, and counties with more than one 
power plant. The dummy variables were not significant in any of the models, and 
their inclusion did not result in other covariates loosing statistical significance.     
 
Finally, another complication involves 28 power plants located in zip codes that 
do not have Census 2000 data on community variables included in the 
                                                 
20
 Such concerns are not unique to this analysis. It is reasonable to assume that most studies 
examining local community characteristics for a large number of polluting facilities have at least 
some cases with more than one facility located in the same zip code, census tract, and county. 
Yet, studies throughout the literature examine polluting facilities in relation to local demographic 
variables without hierarchically grouping the facilities by zip code, census tract, and county.  
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analysis21. Also, there are 10 power plants located in census tracts that do not 
have Census 2000 data on community variables included in the analysis. Some 
of these zip codes and census tracts had no population at all. Others had some 
population but had no specified owner occupied housing units. The analysis 
retains the power plants located in these areas. Each power plant located in one 
of the problematic zip codes is assigned to an immediately adjoining five-digit zip 
code in the same zip code tabulation area. Each power plant located in one of 
the problematic census tracts is assigned to an immediately adjoining census 
tract in the same county. Consideration was given to simply dropping all facilities 
located in these areas. Although there were some minor changes primarily 
involving control variables, none of the significant predictor variables at either 
level of analysis lost statistical significance in any of the models when these 
power plants were dropped. The decision was made to retain the power plants 
located in the problematic areas because their retention prevented the loss of 
one corporation at level-2 in the multilevel analysis22.  
 
                                                 
 
21
 Most of these problematic zip codes are designated by the suffix HH after the 3-digit zip code 
tabulation area assigned by the U.S. Census Bureau. The HH suffix is used where water bodies 
such as oceans, bays, and large rivers and lakes are assigned to a water zip code tabulation 
area (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Some of these problematic zip codes are in large rural areas 
and undeveloped areas near parks, forests, deserts, or mountains. Zip codes in these areas 
typically are designated by the suffix XX after the 3-digit zip code tabulation area. Technical 
documentation by the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) discusses zip codes with an HH suffix and zip 
codes with an XX suffix in detail. Further information is available on U.S. Census Bureau 
website. 
 
22
 One corporation is lost at level-2 when dropping the power plants located in the problematic 
census tracts. The multi-level analysis does not lose any corporation at level-2 when dropping 
the power plants located in the problematic zip codes.     
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METHODS AND MODEL STRUCTURE  
 
The multilevel modeling is conducted in Stata using the xtmixed command. The 
models contain the fixed effects and any random effects necessary to account 
for significant random deviations other than those associated with the overall 
error term. The Stata Reference Manual (StataCorp 2005) and other sources on 
multilevel modeling (Leckie 2010) discuss the differences between fixed and 
random effects and the use of the Stata xtmixed command to fit linear mixed 
models for analyses that involve multiple levels of cross-sectional data as well 
as longitudinal data.  
 
The xtmixed command allows for fitting multilevel models with either maximum 
likelihood estimation or restricted maximum likelihood estimation. The Stata 
Reference Manual (StataCorp 2005) suggests restricted maximum likelihood is 
appropriate for small samples with balanced data, but the question of which 
estimator to use remains a matter of personal taste. The models in this analysis 
use maximum likelihood estimation because the data are imbalanced; different 
numbers of power plants are owned by the different corporations in the analysis.   
 
Social scientists have used multilevel models to study a wide range of 
phenomena (Mason et al. 1983; Poston and Duan 2000; Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002; Zhou 2000). Multilevel models – which some methodologists refer 
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to as hierarchical linear models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) – have 
advantages over OLS regression. Multilevel models are appropriate when 
individual units are nested within larger groups. The assumptions of OLS 
regression are violated when it fails to account for the nesting of individual units 
within units at the higher level of analysis and fails to include random effects 
parameters for coefficients that vary significantly across units at the higher level 
of analysis. For instance, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) stress that OLS models 
are inappropriate for multilevel designs in which several explanatory variables 
are measured at the organizational level, but the outcome variable is measured 
at the individual unit level. In sum, multilevel modeling best explains the 
multilevel effects on the dependent variable when variations exist at both levels 
of analysis (Leckie 2010; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Singer 1998). 
 
Researchers express the notation used for multilevel models in one of two ways. 
First, some researchers express the models in matrix notation. A basic two-level 
model that includes the main effects of level-1 and level-2 variables on the 
dependent outcome variable can be expressed in matrix notation as follows: 
 
y = Xβ + Zu + ε, 
 
Where y is a vector of responses, X is a matrix for fixed effects β, Z is a matrix 
for random effects u, and ε is a vector of errors. The fixed effects are estimated 
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directly and are analogous to standard regression coefficients (StataCorp 2005). 
The random effects are not estimated directly, but are summarized according to 
variance components estimated with the residual variance (StataCorp 2005).  
 
The alternative notation used to express the basic two-level model provides a 
more in-depth elaboration of the nested structure of the data. This approach 
explicates how the multilevel model is constructed through the specification and 
combination of different level-1 models and level-2 models. The approach 
typically specifies the following level-1 and level-2 equations and then combines 
them by substitution to fit an unconditional null model:   
 
Level-1 Null Model:  Yij  = β0j + rij   
 
Level-2 Null Model:  β0j  =  γ00 + u0j 
 
Combined Null Model: Yij  =   γ00 + u0j + rij    
 
The level-1 null model includes only the level-2 parameter β0j to predict the 
outcome for each level-1 unit Yij. The outcome variable for the i
th level-1 unit in 
the jth level-2 unit equals the average outcome in level-2 unit j plus the level-1 
unit error rij. In other words, the outcome for individual unit i equals the sum of 
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an intercept β0j for the level-2 unit j and the random error rij associated with the 
level-1 unit i that is nested in level-2 unit j.  
 
The overall intercept γ00 in the level-2 null model is fixed. It represents the 
average outcome for the population of all level-1 units i. The u0j represents the 
random effect that is common to the level-1 units i that are nested in level-2 unit 
j. Thus, the level-2 intercepts are equal to the sum of the overall mean γ00 plus 
the u0j random deviations from that mean.  
 
The combined null model includes the grand mean γ00 with the level-2 effect u0j 
and the level-1 effect rij. Methodologists refer to the two random effects 
parameters u0j and rij as the τ00 and the σ
2, respectively. Their sum equals the 
total variance of Yij. The τ00 represents the within group variability, and the σ
2 
represents the between group variability. The greater the τ00 is relative to the σ
2, 
the greater the proportion of the total variation that is between level-2 units and 
the greater the importance of using multilevel modeling.  
 
Multiple predictor and control variables may be included in the basic two-level 
model, and different combinations of fixed and random effects may be specified. 
Empirically, not every slope necessarily requires a variance component in the 
random effects portion of the multilevel model (Leckie 2010; Singer 1998; 
StataCorp 2005). Accordingly, it is not necessary to include a random effects 
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parameter for a slope that does not vary significantly across level-2 units23. After 
all, the null hypothesis that the variance component for a slope equals zero 
cannot be rejected if the component is insignificantly small24. Slopes that do not 
vary significantly across level-2 units therefore can be constrained as fixed in a 
relatively simpler and more restricted multilevel model that better fits the data 
(Leckie 2010; Singer 1998). The failure to include random effects parameters for 
slopes that vary significantly across level-2 units, on the other hand, can result in 
false inferences about the fixed effects coefficients in the multilevel model and 
incorrect conclusions about the hypotheses tested in the multilevel research.       
 
The multilevel models shown in the next chapter include fixed effects coefficients 
for multiple variables at both level-1 and level-2. The models also include a 
random effects parameter for one significantly varying slope. The basic model-
building notation can be expressed as follows:  
 
                                                 
23
 The commonly accepted approach for testing the significance of a variance component is to 
use a likelihood ratio chi-squared test comparing the model with the variance component to the 
otherwise same model without the variance component (Leckie 2010; Singer 1998; StataCorp 
2005). This basic approach is used to test the significance of variance components in this 
dissertation. Alternatively, some statistical programs report Wald Z significance tests for variance 
components that are equal to the estimate divided by its standard error. Singer (1998: p. 351), 
however, notes critically that: ―The validity of these tests has been called into question both 
because they rely on large sample approximations (not useful with the small sample sizes often 
analyzed using multilevel models) and because variance components are known to have 
skewed (and bounded) sampling distributions that render normal approximations such as these 
questionable.‖            
 
24
 Also, the multilevel analysis in this dissertation uses the Stata default independent variance-
covariance structure that allows for a distinct variance parameter for each random effect, but 
assumes all covariances are zero. The unstructured alternative that allows all variances and 
covariances to be distinct is unnecessary if no covariance component is statistically significant.   
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Level-1 Specified Model:  Yij  = β0j + β1jX1ij + β2jX2ij + … + βPjXPij + rij 
  
Level-2 Specified Model:  β0j  =  γ00 + γ01W1j + γ02W2j + … + γ0QWQj + u0j 
   
Β1j  =  γ10 + u1j 
   
Β2j  =  γ20 
         . . 
         . . 
         . . 
ΒPj  =  γP0 
 
Combined Specified Model: Yij  = γ00 + γ01W1j + γ02W2j + … + γ0QWQj + 
γ10X1ij + γ20X2ij  + … + γP0XPij + u0j + u1jX1ij + rij
  
Multilevel modelers refer to the level-1 equations and level-2 equations as within 
group equations and between group equations, respectively. The level-1 model 
includes β0j representing the intercept or the average value of Yij for level-2 unit j 
and the βPj representing the slopes of variables XPij for the level-1 units i nested 
in level-2 unit j. The level-1 model also includes the random error term rij for the 
individual level-1 unit i in level-2 unit j.  
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The level-1 intercept β0j and slopes βPj are modeled as outcomes in the level-2 
equations. The γ00 and the γ0Q in the level-2 model are used to predict β0j, and 
the γP0 are used to predict ΒPj. The significantly varying slope Β1j equals γ10 plus 
the random error term u1j. As no other ΒPj varies significantly across level-2 
units, all other ΒPj are equal to γP0 without the addition of random error terms.  
 
The combined model equation now specifies the main effects of the level-2 
variables WQj and the level-1 variables XPij on the dependent variable Yij
25. The 
overall intercept γ00 is the grand mean of Yij, and the γ0Q represent the fixed 
effects of level-2 variables WQj on Yij. The XPij are level-1 predictor and control 
variables for individual unit i in level-2 unit j, and the γP0 represent the fixed 
effects of level-1 variables XPij across level-2 units. The random effects portion 
now includes u0j and rij along with u1jX1ij for the random slope β1j that varies 
significantly across level-2 units.                     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 This research tests only the main effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
outcome variable. Some multilevel modeling examples also include cross-level interaction terms 
in the level-2 equations for ΒPj. Nonetheless, there are many examples of multilevel models that 
do not include such terms. This analysis does not explore potential cross-level interaction 
effects. The models do not converge when all cross-level interaction terms involving all level-2 
variables and all level-1 variables are included. Development of further research questions for 
future studies is being considered to identify specific cross-level interaction terms of theoretical 
interest.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multilevel 
models. The 536 power plants, on average, emitted SO2 at a rate of 5.79 
pounds per megawatt hour. Table 4.1 shows that the mean of the logged form of 
the dependent variable is -1.4226.    
 
The table next reports descriptive statistics for level-2 variables characterizing 
the 51 corporate structures in which the power plants are grouped. The mean 
value of the total assets expressed in $100 million dollars for the 51 corporate 
power producers is 173.59. The mean value of the total number of subsidiaries 
for the 51 ultimate parent companies is 29.78. The mean value of the dividend 
payments by the 51 corporations is 1.09. In other words, these corporations on 
average possess $17,359 million dollars in total assets, have 29.78 subsidiaries 
in the corporate structure, and pay $1.09 dollars in dividends per share.   
                                                 
26
 All facilities in this analysis have greater than zero pounds of SO2 emitted per megawatt hour. 
The mean value of the logged dependent variable is negative because log transformations 
change positive values between zero and one to negative values. Metrics other than megawatt 
hour could be used to decrease the size of the denominator in the calculation of the dependent 
variable and thereby increase all values in the raw distribution so that facilities with values 
between zero and one would have values greater than one. The mean of the log dependent 
variable measure then would be positive, and there would be no substantive change in the 
findings. This analysis uses megawatt hour as the metric to calculate the emissions rates since 
megawatt hour is reported commonly in documentation by NRDC and government agencies.   
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Multilevel Models 
  
 
Variable Measure 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
Dependent Outcome Variable     
Facility SO2 Emissions Rates (Log) 536 -1.42 3.55 
Facility SO2 Emissions Rates 536 5.79 8.59 
Level-2 Corporate Predictor Variables    
Total Assets in $100 Million Dollars 51 173.59 130.80 
Total Number of Subsidiaries  51 29.78 25.31 
Dividends Paid Per Share in $Dollars 51 1.09 0.77 
Level-1 Local Community Predictor Variables     
Community Percent Black (ZIP Codes)   536 11.92 18.24 
Community Percent Black (Census Tracts) 536 11.68 19.84 
Community Percent Families Living in Poverty (ZIP Codes)  536 10.14 7.26 
Community Percent Families Living in Poverty (Census Tracts) 536 10.34 8.96 
Community Median Home Value in $10, 000 Dollars (ZIP Codes)  536 10.53 6.00 
Community Median Home Value in $10, 000 Dollars (Census Tracts) 536 10.80 6.95 
Total Number of Non-Profit Organizations in County (Log)  536 6.62 1.47 
Total Number of Non-Profit Organizations in County 536 2056.2 3701.3 
Level-1 Power Plant and Local Control Variables    
Facility Size (Log) 536 6.25 0.96 
Facility Size 536 759.28 639.48 
Facility Age 536 31.17 21.26 
Facility Percent Coal Generation 536 36.17 47.09 
Cogeneration Facility 536 0.07 0.25 
Local Population Density (/100) 536 9.45 23.71 
 
Descriptive statistics of the original form of the logged variables used in the analysis are indented and 
shown for reference.    
 
 
Table 4.1 next reports descriptive statistics for the zip code and census tract 
measures of the level-1 variables characterizing the communities in which the 
facilities are located. Across the power plants, the average value for the 
percentage of the population that is Black in the community is 11.92 when zip 
codes are used as the geo-unit of analysis and 11.68 when census tracts are 
used as the geo-unit of analysis. Across the facilities, the average value for 
percent families in poverty is 10.14 using zip codes as the community geo-unit 
and 10.34 using census tracts as the community geo-unit. Across the power 
plants, the mean value for the community median home value expressed in 
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$10,000 dollars is 10.53 using zip codes and 10.80 using census tracts. This 
equates to an average value of $105,300 using zip codes and an average value 
of $108,000 using census tracts. Finally, across the facilities, the mean value for 
the total number of non-profit organizations in the local county is 2,056. Table 
4.1 shows that the mean of its logged form is 6.62.  
 
Lastly, Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the level-1 power plant and 
local demographic control variables. Across the power plants, the average 
facility size measured by nameplate generating capacity is 759.28 megawatts. 
The table shows that the mean value of its logged form is 6.25. The mean value 
for the power plant age measure across the facilities is 31.17. The mean value 
across the facilities for the percentage of the total electricity generated that is 
produced from coal is 36.17. The mean value of .07 for the cogeneration dummy 
variable indicates that seven percent of the power plants in the study group are 
cogeneration facilities. Across the facilities, the mean value for the county 
population density measure expressed in hundreds is 9.45. This number 
equates to 945 persons per square mile.      
 
THE MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
Appendix A at the end of the dissertation shows preliminary OLS models parallel 
to the multilevel models in this chapter. The OLS models include all the same 
73 
 
variables at both levels of analysis, but do not allow for intercepts or slopes to 
vary across level-2 units. The discussion here mentions these models because 
violating the assumptions of OLS models can lead to results that are different 
from those of the more appropriate multilevel models. Multicollinearity is not a 
problem in the OLS models. With the exception of one squared term in one 
basic model, all tolerance levels for all variables in all models are above .50 and 
all variance inflation factors are below 2.00. Heteroscedasticity is a problem. The 
Stata Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests indicate significant heteroscedasticity 
for all models in Appendix A. This suggests that there is a lack of independence 
among observations. This feature of the data makes multilevel models, which 
structurally group level-1 units within level-2 units, preferable and necessary.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the results and findings of the multilevel models using zip 
codes as the geo-unit. The null model is a one-way random effects ANOVA 
model. Model 1 includes all variables at level-1, but corporate size as the only 
variable at level-2. Model 1 thus is similar to the model in Grant et al. (2002) that 
includes size as the only firm variable explaining emissions rates at chemical 
plants. Model 2 is the model of primary interest. It includes all level-1 and level-2 
variables shown in Table 4.1. Model 3 is the same as Model 2 except it includes 
a squared term for percent families in poverty since some researchers suggest 
poverty and income variables have quadratic relationships with air pollution 
(Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Pastor et al. 2005).     
74 
 
Table 4.2. Mixed-Effects Estimates of Corporate and Local Community Characteristics 
on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: ZIP Codes for Community Variables 
 
 
 
 
Null Model 
 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3  
Fixed Effects     
Intercept 
 
-1.3010 *** 
[.2536] 
-4.3234 *** 
[.7509] 
-4.7350 *** 
[.7536] 
-5.0425 *** 
[.7258] 
Corporate Characteristics     
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
 .0003 
[.0008] 
-.0009 
[.0009] 
-.0009 
[.0009] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
  .0111 ** 
[.0047] 
.0111 ** 
[.0047] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
  .3153 ** 
[.1194] 
.3187 ** 
[.1194] 
Local Community Characteristics     
Community Percent Black 
 
 .0115 * 
[.0059] 
.0105 * 
[.0058] 
.0083  
[.0059] 
Community Percent Families  
Living in Poverty 
 -.0402 ** 
[.0158] 
-.0376 ** 
[.0157] 
-.0579 *** 
[.0189] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
   .0020 * 
[.0010] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
 -.0122 
[.0188] 
-.0101 
[.0187] 
-.0160 
[.0188] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
 -.1619 ** 
[.0677] 
-.1620 ** 
[.0673] 
-.1851 ** 
[.0681] 
Power Plant and Local Controls     
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
 .2021 * 
[.0915] 
.1883 * 
[.0906] 
.1939 * 
[.0903] 
Facility Age 
 
 .0407 *** 
[.0054] 
.0409 *** 
[.0053] 
.0412 *** 
[.0053] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation  .0488 *** 
[.0022] 
.0483 *** 
[.0022] 
.0481 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
 -.5419  
[.3491] 
-.4238 
[.3496] 
-.3610  
[.3498] 
County Population Density (/100)  .0059  
[.0043] 
.0052 
[.0043] 
.0062  
[.0043] 
Random Effects Parameters     
Variance (Facility Age) 
 
 .0002 * 
[.0001] 
.0002 ** 
[.0001] 
.0002 ** 
[.0001] 
Variance (Constant) 
 
1.8510 *** 
[.6235] 
.0367 
[.0707] 
.0000003 
[.000004] 
.0000007 
[.0002] 
Variance (Level-1 Residual) 
 
10.2984 
[.6582] 
3.4222 
[.2214] 
3.3820 
[.3574] 
3.3533 
[.2142] 
Model Fit Statistics     
Wald Chi2 . 1037.50 *** 1112.56 *** 1117.54 *** 
AIC 2824.91 2238.90 2232.58 2230.85 
BIC 2837.76 2298.87 2301.12 2303.68 
N Level-2 51 51 51 51 
N Level-1 536 536 536 536 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance reported for fixed effects. 
One-tail LR Chi2 significance reported for random effect variance components (facility age and constant) 
and Wald model fit statistic.  
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Examination of the random effects parameters in the null model is a precondition 
for multilevel modeling. The null model indicates that the between corporation 
level-2 variance for the random intercept is estimated as 1.85 and that the within 
corporation level-1 facility residual variance is estimated as 10.30. The .001 
significance level of the variance component for the random intercept indicates 
that corporations differ in terms of their average facility SO2 emissions rates and 
that multilevel modeling is appropriate27. A variance partition coefficient is 
calculated by dividing the variance estimate for the random intercept over the 
sum of the estimated intercept variance component and the estimated level-1 
residual variance component. This coefficient, which some methodologists refer 
to as the intra-class correlation coefficient, equals .15 for the null model. Thus, 
although much of the variation in power plant SO2 emissions rates occurs at the 
facility level within corporations, a substantial 15 percent of the variance is 
attributed to differences among corporations.   
 
The fixed effects coefficients for the explanatory variables included in Model 1, 
Model 2, and Model 3 are used to test the hypotheses stated in Chapter II of the 
dissertation. Before focusing on the fixed effects, however, further discussion of 
the random effects parameters and the overall model fit statistics is required. 
                                                 
27
 The significance of the variance component for the random intercept is derived from a 
likelihood ratio chi-squared test comparing the null model shown in Table 4.2 to an equivalent 
null single-level model. Interested readers can see Leckie (2010) for further details on how to 
test the variance estimate of the intercept for statistical significance in an unconditional null 
model.    
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The slope for power plant age varies significantly across corporations in all three 
models. No other slope coefficient for any other variable varies significantly in 
any model28. In accordance with Leckie (2010) and Singer (1998), all other 
slopes therefore are constrained as fixed. The models are estimated using the 
independent variance-covariance structure, which is the default in Stata. The 
unstructured alternative is not used because the covariance component for the 
random intercept and the randomly varying slope is not significant in any 
model29.  
 
Concerning overall model fit, the Wald chi-squared statistics are significant at 
the .001 level in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. The fixed effects coefficients, 
taken jointly, are significant in each of the three models. Moreover, the variance 
estimate of the random intercept is reduced by almost 100 percent when the 
explanatory variables are included in the fixed effects portion of the models and 
the variance component for the facility age slope is included in the random 
effects portion of the models. The random effect estimate of the level-1 facility 
                                                 
28
 A separate likelihood ratio chi-squared test was conducted for each explanatory variable to 
determine if its slope varies significantly. For each predictor and control variable, the test 
compared the model with the variance component for the slope in question to the otherwise 
same model without the variance component for the slope in question. Many sources have 
discussed the use of likelihood ratio tests to establish whether a variance component for any 
given slope should be included in the random effects portion of a multilevel model (Leckie 2010; 
Singer 1998; StataCorp 2005).    
  
29
 A likelihood ratio chi-squared test also was conducted in each of the models to determine if 
the unstructured variance-covariance structure should be used to allow for random intercepts 
and random slopes to covary. The basic test was conducted by comparing the model with the 
covariance component to the otherwise same model without the covariance component. As the 
covariance component was insignificantly small in each model, the three models were fit using 
the Stata independent covariance structure that by default assumes all covariances are zero.  
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residual variance is reduced by about two-thirds in each of the three models. All 
of this indicates that the multilevel modeling in Table 4.2 fits the data effectively. 
Finally, the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) improves slightly from Model 1 to 
Model 2 to Model 3. The Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
indicates otherwise because the BIC has a higher penalty for the increased 
number of parameters estimated. 
 
The following assessment of the fixed effects coefficients in Table 4.2 focuses 
separately across the three models on each of the variables used to test each of 
the hypotheses. The significance of each predictor and control variable is 
discussed for all three models. The interpretation of the magnitude of the 
predictor variables is based on Model 2.  
       
The coefficient for the level-2 corporate size variable is not significant in any of 
the three models. In other words, the coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero in any model. The total assets of the power-producing corporations do not 
have an effect on the SO2 emissions rates at the facility level. The results shown 
in Table 4.2 therefore do not provide any support for the first hypothesis.   
 
The level-2 coefficient for the total number of subsidiaries in the corporate 
structure is positive and significant at the .01 level in Model 2. To quantify this 
relationship, there is on average a 1.12 percent increase in facility SO2 
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emissions rates for each additional subsidiary in the overall structure of the 
ultimate parent company ((exp.(.0111)-1) * 100 = 1.12). The total subsidiaries 
coefficient also is positive and significant at the .01 level in Model 3. These 
findings strongly support Hypothesis 2. 
 
Regarding the third hypothesis, the level-2 coefficient for corporate dividend 
payments is positive and significant at the .01 level in Model 2. For an additional 
dollar of dividends paid per share, there is on average an expected 37.07 
percent increase in power plant SO2 emissions rates ((exp.(.3153)-1) * 100 = 
37.07). The level-2 dividend payments coefficient also is positive and significant 
at the .01 level in Model 3. These findings (i.e., statistical significance and large 
magnitude effect) are consistent with Prechel (2009) and provide strong support 
for Hypothesis 3.   
 
The level-1 coefficient for community percent Black is positive and significant at 
the .05 level in Model 1. The positive coefficient for percent Black also is 
significant at .05 when the level-2 subsidiary and dividend variables are entered 
into Model 2. With each one percentage point increase in percent Black, there is 
on average a 1.06 percent increase in power plant SO2 emissions rates  
((exp.(.0105)-1) * 100 = 1.06). Although these findings in Table 4.2 provide 
some empirical support for Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for percent Black loses 
significance when the squared term for poverty is entered into Model 3.   
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Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the coefficient for community percent families in 
poverty is negative and significant at the .01 level in Model 1. It also is negative 
and significant at the .01 level in Model 2. For a one percentage point increase 
in percent families in poverty, facility SO2 emissions rates on average decrease 
by 3.83 percent ((exp.(-.0376)-1 * 100 = -3.83). The negative coefficient for 
percent families in poverty is significant at the .001 level when its square is 
included in Model 330. The positive coefficient for the squared term is significant 
at the .05 level and provides some support for researchers who suggest that 
quadratic functions are appropriate to model the non-linear relationships that 
poverty and income variables have with pollution in general (Boer, Pastor, Sadd, 
Snyder 1997; Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Pastor 
2005). Specifically, the effects of percent families in poverty on the facility SO2 
emissions rates follows a U-shaped pattern that turns positive at the threshold 
value of 14.48 percent families in poverty31.       
 
The level-1 coefficient for community median home value is not significant in 
Model 1, Model 2, or Model 3. Hence, using zip codes as the community geo-
unit of analysis, the median home value in the community does not have a 
                                                 
30
 Percent families in poverty and its square are measured as deviations from the grand mean in 
the third model. This basic technique is used commonly to minimize multicollinearity problems 
that are a potential concern when researchers include squared terms to model quadratic 
functions.  
    
31
 The threshold value at which the variable effects of the quadratic function ax
2
 + bx + c turns in 
direction can be calculated at x = -b/2a.  
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statistically significant effect on the rates at which power plants emit SO2. The 
modeling results in Table 4.2 provide no support for Hypothesis 6.   
 
All three models support Hypothesis 7. In Model 1, the coefficient for the log of 
the total number of non-profit organizations in the local county is negative and 
significant at the .01 level. Neither the direction nor the significance of the 
coefficient is affected by the inclusion of the level-2 subsidiary and dividend 
variables in Model 2. For each one percent increase in the number of non-profit 
organizations, there is on average a .16 percent decrease in facility SO2 
emissions rates ((= -.162 * ln(1.01) * 100). The negative coefficient for the 
number of non-profit organizations remains significant at the .01 level when the 
squared term for poverty is included in Model 3. These findings indicate local 
organizing capacity has a negative effect on power plant SO2 emissions rates.     
 
Finally, the fixed effects coefficients for several of the level-1 control variables 
are significant. The coefficient for facility size is positive and significant at the .05 
level in all three models. The coefficient for facility age is positive and significant 
at the .001 level in all of the models. The coefficient for facility percent coal 
generation also is positive and significant at the .001 level in each of the three 
models. Neither the cogeneration facility dummy variable nor the local 
population density variable is significant in any model.        
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Table 4.3 shows the results and findings of the same models from Table 4.2 
using census tracts as the community geo-unit of analysis. The unconditional 
null model is shown again only for reference. The models used to test the 
hypotheses now are labeled Model 1a, Model 2a, and Model 3a. The 
assessment of the results and findings from these three models follows the 
same format as the previous discussion from the corresponding three models in 
Table 4.2 where zip codes are used as the community geo-unit of analysis32.    
 
As in Table 4.2, the multilevel models shown in Table 4.3 fit the data 
appropriately. The Wald chi-squared statistics for all three of the models are 
significant at the .001 level. Taken jointly, the fixed effects coefficients are 
significant in Model 1a, Model 2a, and Model 3a. Compared to the unconditional 
null model, the variance estimate of the random intercept again is reduced by 
almost 100 percent when the predictor and control variables are included in the 
fixed effects portion of the models and the variance component for the facility 
age slope is included in the random effects portion of the models. The estimate 
of the level-1 facility residual variance again is reduced by about two-thirds in 
each of the three models. Lastly, the AIC and BIC improve noticeably compared 
to the unconditional null model.   
                                                 
32
 Grant et al. (2002) show their results and findings using only zip codes to measure community 
demographic variables, while noting that their results and findings do not differ substantially 
when census tract measures are used instead. However, this study shows that results and 
findings involving community demographic variables and power plant SO2 emissions rates do 
indeed differ when census tracts are used instead of zip codes as the community geo-unit of 
analysis.  
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Table 4.3. Mixed-Effects Estimates of Corporate and Local Community Characteristics 
on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: Census Tracts for Community Variables 
 
 
 
 
Null Model 
 
 
 
Model 1a 
 
 
Model 2a 
 
 
Model 3a  
Fixed Effects     
Intercept 
 
-1.3010 *** 
[.2536] 
-4.3159 *** 
[.7484] 
-4.7220 *** 
[.7511] 
-4.9081 *** 
[.7328] 
Corporate Characteristics     
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
 .0005 
[.0009] 
-.0007 
[.0009] 
-.0007 
[.0009] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
  .0121 ** 
[.0048] 
.0122 ** 
[.0048] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
  .3066 ** 
[.1216] 
.3092 ** 
[.1218] 
Local Community Characteristics     
Community Percent Black 
 
 .0043 
[.0054] 
.0031 
[.0053] 
.0032 
[.0053] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty 
 -.0218 * 
[.0124] 
-.0199  
[.0123] 
-.0280 * 
[.0167] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
   .0004 
[.0005] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
 -.0338 * 
[.0157] 
-.0328 * 
[.0156] 
-.0352 * 
[.0159] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
 -.1336 * 
[.0670] 
-.1326 * 
[.0668] 
-.1349 * 
[.0668] 
Power Plant and Local Controls     
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
 .1825 * 
[.0921] 
.1689 * 
[.0913] 
.1672 * 
[.0913] 
Facility Age 
 
 .0414 *** 
[.0055] 
.0415 *** 
[.0054] 
.0412 *** 
[.0054] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation  .0485 *** 
[.0023] 
.0480 *** 
[.0022] 
.0480 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
 -.6538 * 
[.3463] 
-.5311  
[.3473] 
-.5149  
[.3479] 
County Population Density (/100)  .0077 * 
[.0044] 
.0071  
[.0044] 
.0068  
[.0044] 
Random Effects Parameters     
Variance (Facility Age) 
 
 .0002 ** 
[.0001] 
.0002 *** 
[.0001] 
.0002 *** 
[.0001] 
Variance (Constant) 
 
1.8510 *** 
[.6235] 
.0284 
[.0708] 
.0000003 
[.000002] 
.0000002 
[.00006] 
Variance (Level-1 Residual) 
 
10.2984 
[.6582] 
3.4013 
[.2201] 
3.3624 
[.2162] 
3.3571 
[.2149] 
Model Fit Statistics     
Wald Chi2 . 1005.93 *** 1079.88 *** 1079.02 *** 
AIC 2824.91 2239.93 2233.39 2234.87 
BIC 2837.76 2299.91 2301.93 2307.70 
N Level-2 51 51 51 51 
N Level-1 536 536 536 536 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance reported for fixed effects. 
One-tail LR Chi2 significance reported for random effect variance components (facility age and constant) 
and Wald model fit statistic.  
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Table 4.3 shows that there is no change from Table 4.2 in terms of the level-2 
coefficients used to test the hypothesized effects of the corporate characteristics 
on the power plant SO2 emissions rates. The level-2 coefficient for corporate 
size again is statistically insignificant in all three models. Both the level-2 
coefficient for total number of subsidiaries and the level-2 coefficient for dividend 
payments again are positive in direction and significant at the .01 level when 
they are included in Model 2a. The coefficients for these corporate-level 
variables again remain positive and significant at the .01 level in Model 3a. 
These results and findings corroborate those in Table 4.2. Neither Table 4.2 nor 
Table 4.3 provides any support for Hypothesis 1. The findings shown in both of 
these tables provide strong empirical evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3.     
 
There is no longer any support for Hypothesis 4 when census tracts are used as 
the community geo-unit of analysis. The level-1 coefficient for community 
percent Black loses statistical significance in Model 1a and Model 2a. As in 
Table 4.2, the percent Black coefficient is insignificant in Model 3a. In sum, the 
results shown in Table 4.3 refute the limited empirical evidence supporting the 
fourth hypothesis that was shown in Table 4.2.     
 
The level-1 coefficient for community percent families in poverty is negative and 
significant at the .05 level in Model 1a of Table 4.3. The negative coefficient 
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loses significance in Model 2a, but regains significance at the .05 level when the 
squared term for percent families in poverty is included in Model 3a. Hence, no 
model in either Table 4.2 or Table 4.3 supports the hypothesized positive linear 
relationship between percent families in poverty and power plant SO2 emissions 
rates. As the squared term for percent families in poverty is not significant in 
Model 3a of Table 4.3, the quadratic effect suggested by the significant squared 
term in Table 4.2 is not corroborated.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that the level-1 coefficient for community median home value is 
negative as hypothesized and significant at the .01 level in all three of the 
models when the census tracts are used as the community geo-unit of analysis. 
For a ten thousand dollar increase in the median home value, there is on 
average a 3.33 percent decrease power plant SO2 emissions rates ((exp.(-
.0328)-1) * 100 = -3.33). In contrast to the insignificant results shown in Table 
4.2, these findings do support the sixth hypothesis.   
  
Supporting the seventh hypothesis, all three models in Table 4.3 indicate that 
the coefficient for the total number of non-profit organizations in the county is 
negative and significant at the .05 level. There is on average a .13 percent 
decrease in power plant SO2 emissions rates for each one percent increase in 
the number of non-profit organizations. The findings of Table 4.3 thus 
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corroborate the significant negative effects shown in Table 4.2 and provide 
consistent support for Hypothesis 7.       
 
The coefficients for the level-1 control variables generally are in agreement with 
those shown in Table 4.2. The coefficient for facility size again is positive and 
significant at the .05 level in all three models. The coefficients for both facility 
age and percent coal generation again are positive and significant at the .001 
level in all of the models. The only differences from Table 4.2 in terms of control 
variables is that the negative coefficient for the cogeneration facility dummy 
variable and the positive coefficient for the local population density control 
variable both are significant at the .05 level in Model 1a of Table 4.3. In 
concurrence with the results shown in Table 4.2, neither the cogeneration facility 
dummy variable nor local population density is significant in either Model 2a or 
Model 3a.        
 
Finally, Appendix B shows the same three models from Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
after dropping the observations where immediately adjoining zip codes and 
census tracts had to be used because power plant facilities are located in zip 
codes and census tracts that do not have Census 2000 data for community 
variables in the analysis. Table B.1 corresponds to Table 4.2. Table B.2 
corresponds to Table 4.3.      
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Table B.1 and Table B.2 indicate that dropping the facilities located in the 
problematic geo-unit areas does not affect the level-2 coefficients used to test 
the corporate hypotheses. The total assets coefficient is not significant in any of 
the models. The coefficients for total number of subsidiaries and dividend 
payments both are significantly positive in Table B.1 and Table B.2. This all 
corroborates the results and findings shown this chapter. There is no support for 
Hypothesis 1. There is consistently strong support for Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3.       
 
None of the level-1 predictor variables loses statistical significance in any model 
of Table B.1 or Table B.2. Nonetheless, the insignificant positive coefficient for 
percent Black in Model 3 of Table 4.2 does become significant at the .05 level in 
Model 3 of Table B.1. This provides some additional support for Hypothesis 4. 
Also, the insignificantly negative percent family in poverty coefficient in Model 2a 
of Table 4.3 becomes significant at the .05 level in Model 2a of Table B.2. This 
provides more evidence refuting the hypothesized linear relationship between 
poverty and emissions rates.   
 
There are several differences involving level-1 control variables. The facility size 
variable is not significant in any model of Table B.1. The negative coefficient for 
the cogeneration facility variable is significant in Model 1 of Table B.1, and it is 
significant in all three models of Table B.2. The positive coefficient for local 
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population density gains significance in all models of Table B.1, but loses 
significance in Model 1a of Table B.2. Although these differences in control 
variables are worth mentioning, they do not affect the assessment of either the 
corporate hypotheses or the local community hypotheses.            
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conceptual framework guiding this dissertation has drawn from ecostructural 
theory, organizational resource dependence theory, and leading theories of 
environmental inequality. The multilevel examination is important for several 
reasons. First, including corporate characteristics in the analysis is important 
because managers of corporations that own polluting facilities make decisions 
regarding production priorities and pollution abatement technologies that affect 
day-to-day operations at the facilities. Second, including the organizing capacity 
variable in the examination of community characteristics is important because of 
the deterrent effects that local-based organizations can have on pollution. Third, 
the inclusion of facility characteristics as control variables increases confidence 
in the interpretation of findings. The following sections summarize the findings at 
each level of analysis and discuss implications for research and public policy.       
 
SUMMARY DISCUSSION  
  
Discussion of Corporate Findings 
 
The findings showing that the total number of subsidiaries in the corporate 
structure relates positively to power plant SO2 emissions rates are consistent 
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with ecostructural theory (Prechel forthcoming; Prechel and Zheng 2009). These 
findings substantiate the basic argument that the multilayer-subsidiary form has 
created dependencies, incentives, and opportunities that affect ecoefficiency. 
The structural complexity of the multilayer-subsidiary form makes corporate 
behavior difficult to monitor and regulate, while the liability firewalls protect 
parent companies from liability risks involving their legally independent 
subsidiaries. Hence, this corporate form allows and encourages managers to 
externalize pollution costs. 
 
The findings also show that the corporate dividend payments have a significant 
positive effect on power plant SO2 emissions rates. These findings are 
consistent with the arguments of ecostructural theorists and other critical 
environmental sociologists (Prechel 2009; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). The 
multilayer-subsidiary form has made corporate managers dependent on large 
institutional investors and other wealthy shareholders who purchase corporate 
securities. This new layer of capital dependence has created incentives and 
opportunities for corporate managers to maximize shareholder wealth instead of 
investing in pollution abatement technologies (Prechel forthcoming).       
 
These corporate-level findings have implications for both research and public 
policy. Interdisciplinary scientists have concentrated much attention on 
environmental pollution and other policy problems associated with energy and 
90 
 
the pursuit of sustainability (Bent et al. 2002; Lee 2002). Ecostructural theory 
and the findings of this dissertation suggest that environmental scientists must 
focus specifically on examining characteristics of the complex organizations in 
which polluting facilities are embedded. Only then can they fully understand the 
causal factors that explain variations in pollution emitted by the facilities, and 
only then can they advise policy makers on how to create a political-legal 
environment in which sustainable development practices can be implemented to 
protect the human population and the natural environment from pollution.  
 
Critical environmental sociologists maintain that corporations are a threat to 
sustainable development (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2003). 
Accordingly, policy makers have failed to address the ecological impacts of 
corporate activities adequately because the economic interests of corporations 
hold priority over environmental concerns throughout the policy formation 
process. In the case of the electrical power industry, ecostructural research 
recognizes that the economic and energy crises of the 1970s and 1980s 
compelled the state to align its energy policy agenda with the corporate agenda 
of capital accumulation (Prechel forthcoming). The resulting deregulatory 
policies (e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992) have allowed and encouraged 
corporate power producers to externalize pollution costs rather than making 
investments to improve on ecoefficiency (Prechel 2009).    
 
91 
 
Policy makers must strengthen the environmental regulatory framework to 
create conditions that encourage ecoefficiency and thereby promote sustainable 
development. Enacting policies to regulate pollution at the facility level is 
necessary but not sufficient because many decisions regarding production 
priorities and pollution abatement technologies occur at the meso-organizational 
level in the corporations that own the facilities. Policy makers must address the 
dependencies, incentives, and opportunities created by corporate structures and 
the embeddedness of corporate structures in the political-legal environment. 
Specifically, they must address the structural complexity and liability firewalls of 
corporations in the multilayer-subsidiary form and the institutional structure of 
speculative finance that have allowed and encouraged managers to externalize 
pollution costs during the contemporary era.  
 
Discussion of Local Community Findings 
 
The local community examination provides limited support for the environmental 
racism argument advanced by environmental justice advocates. The results 
show no relationship between power plant SO2 emissions rates and percent 
Black when using census tracts as the geo unit of analysis. On the other hand, 
this relationship is significant when using zip codes and does support the 
argument that Black communities are disparately affected by pollution. The 
widely critiqued civil rights strategies that promote Title VI and the disparate 
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impact standard (Clinton 1994; Lee 1997) are applicable – at least potentially – 
as remedies for the unequal mitigation and regulation of risks at power plants 
and other types of polluting facilities. As previously emphasized, however, actual 
attempts to apply these strategies to remedy environmental disparities that 
adversely affect minorities have been unsuccessful. The discussion here follows 
Gorden and Harley (2005) in suggesting that environmental justice advocates 
should focus less attention on trying to transform the legal system by applying 
civil rights laws in environmental justice cases and more attention on organizing 
minority populations so that they can effectively oppose those responsible for 
polluting their communities.         
 
The significant negative relationship between power plant SO2 emissions rates 
and percent families in poverty does not support the argument that poor 
communities with little sociopolitical capacity bear the burdens of pollution 
unequally. Contrary to the linear hypothesis, power plants located in 
communities with larger percentages of families in poverty appear to have lower 
pollution rates than power plants located in communities with smaller 
percentages of families in poverty. Nonetheless, the significant positive 
relationship between power plant SO2 emissions rates and the squared term for 
percent families in poverty – using zip codes – provides some evidence 
suggesting that at a certain threshold the very poorest communities with the very 
least ability to resist pollution bear a greater share of pollution. This is consistent 
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with previous research that indicates poverty and income variables have 
quadratic relationships with air pollution and other types of pollution (Boer et al. 
1997; Brooks and Sethi 1997; Daniels and Friedman 1999; Pastor et al. 2005).  
 
Although the community analysis using zip codes finds no relationship between 
power plant SO2 emissions rates and median home values, the significant 
negative relationship observed when using census tracts is consistent with 
Touch  and Rogers (2005) and supports the argument that pollution abatement 
tends to be remiss at facilities located in communities with relatively low property 
values. These findings cannot be justified under the legal legitimacy assumption 
that underpins the standard rational choice explanation of environmental 
inequality. Managers in industry do not have a legal right to decide where they 
can cut pollution abatement costs simply based on the property values of the 
communities in which their existing facilities are located.  
 
Any potential argument implying that it is rational for managers to violate 
emissions laws would be contingent on sociopolitical factors to explain why they 
tend to violate emissions laws at facilities located in communities with low 
property values but not at facilities located in communities with high property 
values. All else equal, managers cannot reduce pollution abatement costs any 
more by breaking laws at polluting facilities located in low property value 
communities than they can by breaking laws at polluting facilities located in high 
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property value communities. The interpretation here follows the path of least 
resistance theory by recognizing that low property value communities have little 
capacity to oppose managers who fail to comply with emissions laws and 
regulators who fail to enforce compliance with emissions laws. As previously 
discussed, this is a sociopolitical explanation more than a rational choice 
explanation because resistance involves power. The basic concept of power, 
according to many sociologists, exists in social relationships and entails more 
than standard rational choice factors that center on individual calculations of cost 
efficiency and economic utility.  
        
Finally, all models show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
power plant SO2 emissions rates and the logged number non-profit 
organizations in the local county. These findings indicating that local 
organizations have deterrent effects on pollution are consistent with the 
sociopolitical model and the arguments of many different scholars in the 
environmental sociology and social movement literature. They also are 
consistent with ecostructural theory (Grant et al. 2004), which recognizes that 
the organizational structures of local communities can influence the behavior of 
corporations and other types of polluting organizations.  
 
In sum, the findings of the local community analysis coincide with the 
organizational theme of this dissertation. Regardless of the demographic 
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characteristics of the communities (e.g., Black or poor White), local non-profit 
organizations make a significant difference that explains variation in 
environmental pollution. Research scientists studying pollution emitted by power 
plants and other types of polluting facilities must include local organizational 
factors in their analyses so that they can better explain variations in distributions 
of pollution. In addition, environmental justice scholars must place greater 
emphasis on local organizational factors in both their research on pollution and 
their strategies to remedy inequalities involving pollution.   
 
Lastly, the differences in demographic findings observed when using zip codes 
and census tracts follow in accordance with much literature that suggests 
relationships involving environmental pollution and demographic characteristics 
are contingent on the geo unit of analysis. This presents a theoretical problem 
because the demographic findings do not consistently support any model of 
environmental inequality. The contingency of these findings on the geo unit of 
analysis also is problematic for environmental justice advocates who have long 
argued that stronger federal legislation (i.e., an Environmental Justice Act) must 
be passed to address environmental inequality in minority and other distressed 
communities (Bullard 1994). After all, it would be easier to convince federal 
policy makers to enact legislation that addresses environmental inequality if the 
evidence consistently demonstrated the existence of environmental inequality.  
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Future research could perhaps use an alternative methodological approach to 
measure the demographic composition of the communities where the facilities 
are located. As discussed by Liu (2001), the basic approach would entail using 
Geographic Information System Technologies to measure the demographic 
composition within circular areas around the facilities. There are, however, 
considerable difficulties that inhibit the potential application of this approach.  
 
One problem with this alternative approach for measuring the demographic 
characteristics would involve specifying the size of the circular areas. Relatively 
small areas could best represent the communities where the facilities are 
located in many cases, but the number of cases with zero population living near 
the facilities would increase progressively with decreases in the size of the areas 
around the facilities. Another problem is that the Landview software used in this 
dissertation would not be able to calculate the median home values within 
circular areas around the facilities.  
 
Nonetheless, future studies could perhaps address these problems by using 
Landview with other geographic information system technologies to measure 
and compare the median home values and other demographic characteristics 
within circular areas of various diameters (e.g., 2.5 miles, 5 miles, 10 miles, and 
15 miles). Analyses examining pollution rates in relation to demographic 
characteristics then could be conducted. There is of course no guarantee that 
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findings obtained when using circular areas of different sizes to measure the 
demographic characteristics would be more consistent than findings obtained 
when using the conventional zip codes and census tracts to measure the 
demographic characteristics. Hence, there is no guarantee that the alternative 
circular area approach would produce consistent demographic findings to 
support any theoretical model of environmental inequality or to convince policy 
makers that stronger federal legislation is needed to remedy environmental 
inequality.   
 
Discussion of Control Variables  
 
Several facility control variables are significant in all of the models. Specifically, 
every model indicates that the size of power plants, the age of power plants, and 
the percent coal generation at power plants have significant effects on power 
plant SO2 emissions rates. Although the hypotheses in this dissertation do not 
directly focus on these control variables, their inclusion in the models increases 
confidence in the interpretation of the findings involving the predictor variable 
coefficients used to test the hypotheses.  
 
The findings showing a significant positive relationship between power plant size 
and power plant SO2 emissions rates are consistent with the findings of Grant et 
al. (2002) that show a significant positive relationship between facility size and 
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emissions rates in the chemical industry. These findings suggest that – at the 
facility level – big is indeed bad for the environment. However, the findings also 
suggest that other facility characteristics are more important than size.   
 
This analysis shows that power plant age is more important than size. The 
positive relationship between power plant SO2 emissions rates and power plant 
age is significant at the most stringent level of significance in every model. 
These findings are consistent with the criticisms advanced by many 
environmentalists and public health advocates who focus attention on the New 
Source Review exemptions to the Clean Air Act that allow older facilities to avoid 
pollution abatement upgrades. In addition, these findings are consistent with the 
structural inertia arguments that indicate age and size are impediments to 
change (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Such arguments suggest that – even if 
managers want to abate pollution – structural inertia makes the necessary 
technological upgrades more difficult to implement at older and larger facilities 
than at newer and smaller facilities.       
 
The analysis also shows that the slope of the relationship between power plant 
age and power plant SO2 emissions rates is the only slope that varies 
significantly across corporations and thus the only slope for which a variance 
component must be included in the random effects portion of the multilevel 
models. As discussed in Chapter II, this is methodologically crucial because 
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failure to include random effects parameters for intercepts and slopes that vary 
significantly across level-2 units (i.e., corporations) can alter the fixed effects 
coefficients used to test the hypotheses. Including a random effects parameter 
for this significantly varying slope therefore increases confidence in the 
interpretation of how the corporate and community characteristics relate to the 
power plant SO2 emissions rates. This exemplifies the advantages of using 
multilevel modeling to conduct the analysis.  
 
The analysis of standard fixed effects coefficients also indicates that the control 
variable for facility fuel mix is important. As expected, the findings show a 
positive relationship between power plant SO2 emissions rates and percent coal 
generation. These findings are consistent with much scientific research that 
indicates, all else equal, coal is the fossil fuel most responsible for air pollution 
emitted by power plants.          
 
Lastly, there is limited evidence indicating that the cogeneration facility variable 
and the local population density variable are significantly related to power plant 
SO2 emissions rates. These two control variables are significant in the model 
that includes corporate size as the only corporate characteristic and uses 
census tracts as the geo unit of analysis33. Even using census tracts, however, 
                                                 
33
 The insignificance of the cogeneration dummy variable in most models is not surprising given 
the methodology used by the NRDC to measure emissions. As mentioned in Chapter III, the 
NRDC adjusts the emissions data for cogeneration facilities that produce a combination of 
electricity and steam or some other useful form of energy. The NRDC bases its emissions data 
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these variables lose significance when the total subsidiary and dividend payment 
variables are included in the analysis at the corporate level. In other words, the 
relationships involving these two control variables and power plant SO2 
emissions rates are contingent on the corporate characteristics. These findings 
suggest that there really is no causal connection directly linking either of these 
two control variables to power plant SO2 emissions rates.  
 
Further interpretation of these two control variables must proceed with caution 
because Appendix B shows that the findings differ when the analysis drops the 
cases that use adjoining zip codes and census tracts for power plants located in 
areas without demographic data. The tables in Appendix B indicating that the 
cogeneration variable is significant in all models using census tracts and that 
local population density variable is significant in all models using zip codes 
warrant the inclusion of these control variables in the analysis, but also suggest 
that their significance is unstable and contingent on many factors. For example, 
population density is included to control for multiple land-use factors involving 
urbanization and the clustering of industry, housing, transportation, and other 
activities in high-density areas. While it is not surprising that findings involving 
population density differ when the analysis drops facilities located in zip codes 
and census tracts that have no demographic data, it is difficult to attribute the 
                                                                                                                                                
only on emissions associated with electricity generation. This makes the emissions rates for the 
cogeneration facilities more comparable to the emissions rates for other facilities in the analysis.      
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differences to any one specific land use activity associated with population 
density. The important point for this dissertation is that dropping the power 
plants located in the low population density areas does not affect the 
conclusions drawn from testing of the corporate and community hypotheses.          
 
In sum, the findings involving the control variables in this analysis move beyond 
previous research. Ecostructural theorists who focus their primary attention on 
explaining emissions rates at the facility level have not included facility age and 
fuel mix in their analyses. The analysis here shows that both these control 
variables are significant at the most stringent level of significance in every 
model. These findings suggest that ecostructural researchers must include these 
two variables in future studies that explain facility emissions rates. These 
findings also suggest that policy makers must establish a regulatory framework 
to encourage investments in new power plants that use natural gas instead of 
coal to generate electricity. The first priority should be eliminating the New 
Source review exemptions to the Clean Air Act that allow corporate power 
producers to avoid pollution abatement upgrades at old coal-fired power plants.                  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are two general contributions of this research. First, it draws from 
ecostructural theory to examine corporate characteristics as determinants of 
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pollution. Previous research shows that structural and financial characteristics 
involving the multilayer-subsidiary form and the shareholder conception of value 
explain rates of emissions that are aggregated up to the ultimate parent 
company (Prechel forthcoming). This multilevel examination demonstrates that 
the total number of subsidiaries in the corporate structure and the dividend 
payments to shareholders explain emissions rates at the facilities where 
pollution is actually emitted and where potential investments in pollution 
abatement would take place. These findings substantiate the argument that the 
dependencies, incentives, and opportunities created by multilayer-subsidiary 
form and the associated changes in corporate financing allow and encourage 
managers to externalize pollution costs rather than improve on ecoefficiency by 
investing in pollution abatement technologies.      
 
Second, the examination of the local communities draws from environmental 
justice scholars and other researchers in the environmental sociology and social 
movement literature to include several demographic characteristics and one 
local organizational variable. Consistent with the literature, the findings involving 
racial composition and other demographic characteristics are contingent on the 
geographic unit of analysis. Hence, the demographic analysis fails to provide 
consistent support for any model of environmental inequality. Nonetheless, the 
findings involving the local organizational variable support the path of least 
resistance theory that underpins the sociopolitical model. The significant 
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negative relationship between the number of local non-profit organizations and 
power plant SO2 emissions rates is consistent with ecostructural theory (Grant et 
al. 2004), which recognizes the effects that social-structural characteristics of 
local communities can have on environmental pollution.      
 
This multilevel framework demonstrates that theoretical insights from several 
different lines of environmental research can be brought together and tested 
simultaneously. This is important because it shows that both levels of social 
structure explain environmental pollution. Future research can use the multilevel 
framework established here to explain other types of pollutants (e.g., nitrogen 
oxides) emitted by facilities in the electrical power industry and other high-
polluting industries.   
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Table A.1. OLS Regression Estimates of Corporate and Local Community 
Characteristics on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: ZIP Codes for Community 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3  
Main Fixed Effects    
Intercept 
 
-4.4730 *** 
[.7508] 
-4.7988 *** 
[.7540] 
-5.2281 *** 
[.7224] 
Corporate Characteristics    
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
-.0004 
[.0007] 
-.0013 * 
[.0007] 
-.0012 * 
[.0007] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
 .0082 * 
[.0040] 
.0081 * 
[.0039] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
 .3004 ** 
[.1062] 
.2995 ** 
[.1060] 
Local Community Characteristics    
Community Percent Black 
 
.0156 ** 
[.0058] 
.0136 ** 
[.0058] 
.0119 * 
[.0058] 
Community Percent Families  
Living in Poverty 
-.0518 *** 
[.0160] 
-.0476 ** 
[.0160] 
-.0650 *** 
[.0192] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
  .0017 
[.0011] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
-.0113 
[.0186] 
-.0077 
[.0187] 
-.0123 
[.0189] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
-.1353 * 
[.0685] 
-.1323 * 
[.0684] 
-.1517 * 
[.0693] 
Power Plant and Local Controls    
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
.2213 ** 
[.0925] 
.2005 * 
[.0920] 
.2065 * 
[.0920] 
Facility Age 
 
.0410 *** 
[.0048] 
.0410 *** 
[.0048] 
.0413 *** 
[.0048] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation .0496 *** 
[.0022] 
.0492 *** 
[.0022] 
.0489 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
-.5044 
[.3590] 
-.3285 
[.3615] 
-.2769 
[.3623] 
County Population Density (/100) .0075 * 
[.0043] 
.0064  
[.0043] 
.0071 * 
[.0043] 
Model Fit Statistics    
N = 536 536 536 
F =  127.13 *** 108.55 *** 100.72 *** 
R-Squared = .7077 .7135 .7150 
Adjusted R-Squared = .7022 .7069 .7079 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance. 
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Table A.2. OLS Regression Estimates of Corporate and Local Community 
Characteristics on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: Census Tracts for 
Community Variables 
 
 
 
 
Model 1a 
 
 
Model 2a 
 
 
Model 3a  
Main Fixed Effects    
Intercept 
 
-4.5585 *** 
[.7498] 
-4.8613 *** 
[.7517] 
-5.1594 *** 
[.7297] 
Corporate Characteristics    
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
-.0002  
[.0007] 
-.0012 
[.0007] 
-.0012 
[.0007] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
 .0089 * 
[.0040] 
.0090 * 
[.0040] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
 .3021 ** 
[.1064] 
.3046 ** 
[.1066] 
Local Community Characteristics    
Community Percent Black 
 
.0084 
[.0053] 
.0061 
[.0053] 
.0062 
[.0054] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty 
-.0330 ** 
[.0127] 
-.0298 ** 
[.0126] 
-.0353 * 
[.0171] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
  .0003 
[.0006] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
-.0276 * 
[.0154] 
-.0272* 
[.0154] 
-.0287 * 
[.0157] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
-.1025 
[.0678] 
-.0975 
[.0677] 
-.0991 
[.0679] 
Power Plant and Local Controls    
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
.2072 * 
[.0936] 
.1850 * 
[.0931] 
.1839 * 
[.0932] 
Facility Age 
 
.0410 *** 
[.0048] 
.0411 *** 
[.0048] 
.0409 *** 
[.0048] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation .0495 *** 
[.0022] 
.0490 *** 
[.0022] 
.0490 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
-.5977 * 
[.3592] 
-.4219 
[.3613] 
-.4099 
[.3625] 
County Population Density (/100) .0097 * 
[.0044] 
.0087 * 
[.0044] 
.0085 * 
[.0044] 
Model Fit Statistics    
N = 536 536 536 
F = 125.61 *** 107.42 ** 99.03 *** 
R-Squared = .7052 .7114 .7115 
Adjusted R-Squared = .6996 .7048 .7043 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance. 
  
 
 
 
123 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
MIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES OF CORPORATE AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS ON FACILITY SO2 EMISSIONS 
RATES: REDUCED STUDY GROUP FOR PROBLEMATIC ZIP 
CODES AND CENSUS TRACTS  
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Table B.1. Mixed-Effects Estimates of Corporate and Local Community Characteristics 
on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: ZIP Codes for Community Variables 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3  
Fixed Effects    
Intercept 
 
-3.8274 *** 
[.7520] 
-4.3030 *** 
[.7552] 
-4.6446 *** 
[.7294] 
Corporate Characteristics    
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
.0005 
[.0009] 
-.0008 
[.0009] 
-.0008 
[.0009] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
 .0131 ** 
[.0051] 
.0131 ** 
[.0051] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
 .3221 ** 
[.1228] 
.3286 ** 
[.1226] 
Local Community Characteristics    
Community Percent Black 
 
.0128 * 
[.0059] 
.0120 * 
[.0060] 
.0097 * 
[.0059] 
Community Percent Families  
Living in Poverty 
-.0433 ** 
[.0159] 
-.0412 ** 
[.0158] 
-.0607 *** 
[.0188] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
  .0019 * 
[.0010] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
-.0135 
[.0187] 
-.0111 
[.0186] 
-.0163 
[.0188] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
-.1986 ** 
[.0680] 
-.1998 ** 
[.0675] 
-.2218 *** 
[.0683] 
Power Plant and Local Controls    
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
.1475 
[.0927] 
.1371 
[.0916] 
.1413 
[.0913] 
Facility Age 
 
.0400 *** 
[.0056] 
.0404 *** 
[.0055] 
.0406 *** 
[.0055] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation .0494 *** 
[.0023] 
.0488 *** 
[.0022] 
.0486 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
-.6064 * 
[.3473] 
-.4719 
[.3476] 
-.4063 
[.3480] 
County Population Density (/100) .0109 ** 
[.0046] 
.0103 * 
[.0045] 
.0112 ** 
[.0045] 
Random Effects Parameters    
Variance (Facility Age) 
 
.0003 *** 
[.0001] 
.0003 *** 
[.0001] 
.0003 *** 
[.0001] 
Variance (Constant) 
 
.0356 
[.0693] 
.0000009 
[.0002] 
.0000004 
[.0001] 
Variance (Level-1 Residual) 
 
3.1754 
[.2123] 
3.1337 
[.2072] 
3.1090 
[.2053] 
Model Fit Statistics    
Wald Chi2 993.05 *** 1169.56 *** 1077.59 *** 
AIC 2097.13 2089.96 2088.37 
BIC 2156.36 2157.64 2160.29 
N Level-2 51 51 51 
N Level-1 508 508 508 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance reported for fixed effects. 
One-tail LR Chi2 significance reported for random effect variance components (facility age and constant) 
and Wald model fit statistic.  
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Table B.2. Mixed-Effects Estimates of Corporate and Local Community Characteristics 
on Facility SO2 Emissions Rates: Census Tracts for Community Variables 
 
 
 
 
Model 1a 
 
 
Model 2a 
 
 
Model 3a  
Fixed Effects    
Intercept 
 
-4.2422 *** 
[.7528] 
-4.6574 *** 
[.7548] 
-4.8479 *** 
[.7351] 
Corporate Characteristics    
Total Assets  
(in $100 Million Dollars) 
.0005 
[.0009] 
-.0007 
[.0009] 
-.0007 
[.0009] 
Total Number of Subsidiaries 
 
 .0124 ** 
[.0049] 
.0125 ** 
[.0049] 
Dividends Paid Per Share  
(in $Dollars) 
 .3167 ** 
[.1221] 
.3188 ** 
[.1222] 
Local Community Characteristics    
Community Percent Black 
 
.0064 
[.0054] 
.0048 
[.0054] 
.0051 
[.0054] 
Community Percent Families  
Living in Poverty 
-.0239 * 
[.0127] 
-.0211 * 
[.0126] 
-.0311 * 
[.0170] 
Community Percent Families 
Living in Poverty Squared 
  .0005 
[.0005] 
Community Median Home Value 
(in $10 Thousand Dollars) 
-.0298 * 
[.0158] 
-.0283 * 
[.0157] 
-.0311 * 
[.0160] 
Total Number of Non-Profit 
Organizations in County (Log) 
-.1499 * 
[.0679] 
-.1453 * 
[.0675] 
-.1486 * 
[.0675] 
Power Plant and Local Controls    
Facility Megawatt Nameplate 
Generating Capacity (Log) 
.1827 * 
[.0931] 
.1645 * 
[.0923] 
.1623 * 
[.0922] 
Facility Age 
 
.0410 *** 
[.0055] 
.0407 *** 
[.0054] 
.0405 *** 
[.0054] 
Facility Percent Coal Generation .0487 *** 
[.0023] 
.0481 *** 
[.0022] 
.0482 *** 
[.0022] 
Cogeneration Facility 
 
-.8957 ** 
[.3540] 
-.7711 * 
[.3546] 
-.7532 * 
[.3549] 
County Population Density (/100) .0063 
[.0049] 
.0055 
[.0049] 
.0050 
[.0049] 
Random Effects Parameters    
Variance (Facility Age) 
 
.0002 ** 
[.0001] 
.0002 *** 
[.0001] 
.0002 *** 
[.0001] 
Variance (Constant) 
 
.0235 
[.0749] 
.0000001 
[.00004] 
.0000001 
[.] 
Variance (Level-1 Residual) 
 
3.3696 
[.2110] 
3.3231 
[.2147] 
3.3162 
[.2142] 
Model Fit Statistics    
Wald Chi2 1005.76 *** 1076.13 *** 1076.18 *** 
AIC 2194.03 2187.00 2186.23 
BIC 2253.74 2255.25 2254.47 
N Level-2 50 50 50 
N Level-1 526 526 526 
 
*** P<.001; ** P<.01; * P<.05 one-tail significance reported for fixed effects. 
One-tail LR Chi2 significance reported for random effect variance components (facility age and constant) 
and Wald model fit statistic.  
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